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FASHION’S  FUNCTION  IN  INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY  LAW
Christopher Buccafusco* & Jeanne C. Fromer**
Clothing designs can be beautiful.  But they are also functional.  Fashion’s dual nature sits
uneasily in intellectual property law, and its treatment by copyright, trademark, and design
patent laws has often been perplexing.  Much of this difficulty arises from an unclear under-
standing of the nature of functionality in fashion design.  This Article proposes a robust account
of fashion’s function.  It argues that aspects of garment designs are functional not only when
they affect the physical or technological performance of a garment but also when they affect the
perception of the wearer’s body.  Generally, clothes are not designed or chosen simply to look good.
They are also characteristically designed or chosen to look good on.  This approach clarifies the
appropriate treatment of fashion design in intellectual property, and it exposes the conceptual
limitations of the Supreme Court’s recent copyright decision in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity
Brands, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
The creative endeavors of fashion designers have long been celebrated
by consumers, journalists, and even museums.  But despite the widespread
recognition of fashion design’s artistry, it has always had an uncertain status
within intellectual property law.  However beautiful a garment may be, it is
also functional.  It serves to clothe the body, to keep it warm, and to enable
the wearer to perform particular activities while wearing it.
Copyright, trademark, and design patent laws are deeply anxious about
protecting functionality.  They each use various doctrinal devices to block
functional content from their protection, and they channel that content
instead toward the utility patent regime.1  Take copyright law, for example.
Because copyrights are so much easier to obtain and last so much longer
than utility patents, allowing designers to protect functional aspects of their
works with copyright law would upset utility patent law’s careful and different
balance between incentives and competition for functional works.  If copy-
right law fails to adequately screen out the functional aspects of garments,
competition would thus suffer, as would consumers who would end up pay-
ing more for new designs.
1 See infra Section II.A.
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This Article explains how garments function and how different intellec-
tual property regimes should deal with that functionality.  Garments are not
simply functional to the extent that they serve the mechanical or technologi-
cal ends of keeping people properly clothed.  They are also functional to the
extent that they influence the way the wearer is perceived.  When aspects of a
design affect the perception of the wearer, for example, by making him or
her look taller, slimmer, broader, curvier, or lengthier, those aspects of the
design must be treated as functional.2
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Var-
sity Brands, Inc.3 on the copyrightability of cheerleading uniform designs did
not recognize this important aspect of the nature of garment design.
Because the Supreme Court did not accurately assess the functionality of the
cheerleading uniform designs before it, the Court risks conferring a substan-
tial competitive advantage on the designer-plaintiff, one that Congress did
not intend to confer4 and that the designer did not earn.  As we explain
here, the contested features of these uniform designs—stripes, chevrons,
zigzags, and color-blocking—like many features of fashion design, affect the
perception of the wearer by drawing attention to certain aspects of the
wearer’s body over others and by making the wearer seem to be curvier and
have a longer torso.
The account of fashion’s functionality that we develop here also has
important implications for trademark law and design patent law.  Each of
these fields also include doctrines that screen out functional features,
although in different ways than copyright law does.  In this Article, we
explain how trademark and design patent laws can more successfully respond
to attempts by claimants to protect functional aspects of garment design with-
out satisfying utility patent law’s more strenuous demands.
Part I describes our account of fashion’s function.  We explain how, in
addition to technical or mechanical functions, fashion design is also func-
tional when it incorporates features that influence the way the wearer is per-
ceived.  Part II explains how copyright law should treat the functional aspects
of fashion design in light of copyright law’s functionality screening for useful
articles, like garment designs, and the law’s originality and merger doctrines.
In Part III, we illustrate our approach with a case study of the cheerleading
uniforms at issue in Star Athletica and demonstrate how the Court went
wrong.  Parts IV and V, respectively, show how our account of fashion’s func-
tion should affect trademark and design patent laws.
2 For a related analysis of copyrightability of clothing designs, see Giovanna Mar-
chese, Note, A Tri-Partite Classification Scheme to Clarify Conceptual Separability in the Context of
Clothing Design, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 375 (2016).
3 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
4 See Innovative Design Protection Act (IDPA) of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012);
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPA), H.R. 2511, 112th Cong.
(2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 4 15-NOV-17 13:45
54 notre dame law review [vol. 93:1
I. HOW FASHION DESIGN IS FUNCTIONAL
Copyright, trademark, and design patent laws each limit protection for
functional aspects of designs.  They each do so in somewhat different ways, as
we address in Parts II–IV.  Yet these three legal regimes are unified in limit-
ing functional matter as a way to ensure that those design aspects are pro-
tected through utility patent law, if at all.5  Because of their functionality
screens, copyright, trademark, and design patent laws each need to identify
the functional aspects of otherwise protectable designs.6  This identification
task is crucial for fashion designs, which copyright, trademark, and design
patent laws might protect, if only in part.  This Part analyzes how fashion
design is functional.
The features of product designs fall into three mutually exclusive catego-
ries.  Features can be (1) purely functional; (2) purely nonfunctional; or (3)
dual-nature.  Consider how these features might appear in different parts of
an automobile.  The car’s spark plugs are rarely seen, and their design may
be motivated entirely by utilitarian concerns about size and performance.
They would fall into the first category.  The sculpture of a leaping jaguar that
serves as the car’s hood ornament has no functional contribution to the car’s
operation; it exists merely to look good.  It falls into the second, purely non-
functional, category.  Many other aspects of the car’s design are simultane-
ously functional and serve some additional nonfunctional purpose.  The
shape of the car’s hood both makes it look attractive and influences its aero-
dynamics.  The car’s wheels may be designed to look speedy, but they must
also be able to support the car’s weight.  These and other features of the car’s
design are dual-nature.
Knowing what to treat as functional for purposes of garment design
requires understanding how clothing can serve utilitarian ends.  In some
cases this is fairly simple, while in other cases it is more complex.  Decisions
about the physical or technological performance of a garment should clearly
be treated as functional (or at best, “dual nature,” that is, serving both func-
tional and expressive ends).7  For example, a designer’s choices to use fabric
that provides warmth even in the coldest temperature or fabric that wicks
sweat away from the wearer’s body are functional.8
5 See infra Parts II–IV.
6 See also Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L.
REV. 1293 (2017).
7 Cf. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 490 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Cheerleading uniforms have ‘an intrinsic utilitarian function,’ namely to ‘cover the body,
wick away moisture, and withstand the rigors of athletic movements.’” (quoting Appellants’
Brief at 57, Star Athletica, 799 F.3d 468 (No. 14-5237))), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
8 If a designer wants to obtain legal protection for the use of a new kind of perform-
ance-enhancing fabric, she needs to apply for a utility patent and prove that her invention
is novel and nonobvious. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,687,754 (filed Apr. 29, 1969) (claiming
a “[m]ethod of manufacturing an elastic nonwoven fabric”); U.S. Patent No. 3,563,241
(filed Nov. 14, 1968) (“Water-dispersible nonwoven fabric”); U.S. Patent No. 3,577,607
(filed June 13, 1968) (“Separable fastening fabric”).
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On the other hand, various aspects of garment design could be purely
expressive, or aesthetic.  A logo for a sports team emblazoned on a t-shirt is
one such example.  Similarly, a paisley pattern woven into a necktie is proba-
bly a purely expressive element of the tie’s design.  Two-dimensional pictorial
or graphic additions to garment designs are the most plausible candidates of
these designs for purely expressive elements, although as we show below, the
assertion that all two-dimensional elements are nonfunctional is completely
incorrect.
Many of a garment’s design features will be at least partially functional
and fall into the dual-nature category.  For example, the incorporation and
design of pockets on a pair of trousers may be particularly stylish and visually
appealing, but they are also useful because the pockets give the wearer a
place for his or her wallet and keys.  Thus, the design of pockets and other
similar features should also be treated as dual-nature components of garment
design.  The same might be true for the cut of sleeve that provides a certain
degree of warmth, modesty, or ease of movement while simultaneously being
beautiful to perceive.  Many of the aspects of the fit and cut of a garment fall
into the dual-nature category, because although they may look attractive in
their own right, they also affect the garment’s technical or physical perform-
ance as a piece of apparel.
Designs can importantly also function in ways that go beyond standard
mechanical or technological utility.  In particular, the designs of many gar-
ments are intended to and are purchased because they make their wearers look
attractive.  A designer’s choices about hemline, neckline, darting, and, some-
times, fabric prints influence people’s perceptions of the wearer.  As one
design expert puts it, garment design is a unique form of visual art because of
the “pervading sense of the human qualities present.”9  A shopper does not
simply ask of a garment, “Does it look good?”  In addition, and more impor-
tantly, he or she asks, “Does it look good on?” and “Does it make me look
good?”10  In this way, the garment’s design is valued for what it can do when it
is being used.  Thus, in addition to the mechanical functions of garment
designs, another intrinsic—or essential—function garment designs tend to
share is that many of their design features are incorporated to affect the per-
ception of the wearer.11
9 MARILYN REVELL DELONG, THE WAY WE LOOK: DRESS AND AESTHETICS 134 (2d ed.
1998).
10 See, e.g., J. Fan, Perception of Body Appearance and Its Relation to Clothing, in CLOTHING
APPEARANCE AND FIT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 1 (J. Fan et al. eds., 2004) (“Few people
have a perfect body.  Most people would like to improve their appearance with appropriate
clothing, by camouflaging their less desirable attributes and highlighting the more attrac-
tive aspects of their bodies.”).
11 To be sure, there are some instances of haute couture and other fashion designs
that are decidedly not about making the wearer look good.  For example, for her spring
1997 showing for Comme des Garc¸ons, Rei Kawakubo—as Vogue described it—“featured
tubelike gingham dresses stuffed with lumpen filler that sculpted—some said deformed—a
new silhouette.” Spring 1997 Ready-To-Wear: Comme des Garc¸ons, VOGUE: RUNWAY (2017),
http://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/spring-1997-ready-to-wear/comme-des-garcons
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Many features of garment design—line, shape, texture, color, and
print—exploit features of human visual perception and optical illusions to
influence the way in which the wearer’s body is perceived.12  Importantly,
these visual effects can be created with both three-dimensional design tech-
niques such as garment shape and cut as well as with two-dimensional design
techniques such as patterns, stripes, and color.  Thus, the frequent assertion
that two-dimensional fabric design is nonfunctional13 is in many cases wrong
when the design affects how the wearer is perceived.14  Below, we illustrate a
number of these techniques, ranging from camouflage to stripe placement.
As all shoppers know, a certain style or cut of a garment may look good
on one person but not on another.15  And different sorts of designs may
affect how people’s bodies look.  This is not accidental.  Design choices cre-
ate visual effects that can vary the size or shape of the wearer’s body or body
parts.  In this section, we illustrate a number of the most prominent design
techniques.  Our goal here is not to catalog garment design techniques
exhaustively, but rather, by choosing common examples, to illustrate the
nature of design functionality.
(last visited Oct. 16, 2017).  In such cases, one can still ask whether particular aspects of
such fashion design are incorporated to affect the perception of the wearer, as with the
unhealthy-looking lumps perceived on the wearers of Kawakubo’s gingham dresses.  If so,
those aspects are just as functional as those that are incorporated to make the wearer look
good.  Other design aspects of some haute couture and other fashion designs might be
purely expressive, with the appearance on the wearer’s body being beside the point.  Those
design aspects are unlikely to be functional in the sense described here.
12 See MARIAN L. DAVIS, VISUAL DESIGN IN DRESS 21–23, 33 (3d ed. 1996); DELONG,
supra note 9, at 42, 106–07, 132–33, 166; MARILYN J. HORN & LOIS M. GUREL, THE SECOND
SKIN 314 (3d ed. 1981).
13 See, e.g., Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005).  For
an elaboration of this point, see infra subsection II.C.1.
14 Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
that the black color of an outboard engine served the utilitarian purpose of making the
engine look smaller, and as a result, was undeserving of trademark protection).  William
Patry, in his treatise, supports the notion that two-dimensional designs are nonfunctional.
He asks, “How could it possibly matter whether the design is imprinted on a rug or on a
uniform?”  2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:151 (2017).  As our examples illus-
trate, however, the placement of two-dimensional designs on a garment can substantially
alter how the wearer is perceived.  And we strongly suspect that soldiers on the battlefront
care, as a protective matter, whether the particular camouflage they are wearing is well
matched to their surroundings.  Hugo Gye, How U.S. Army Spent $5 Billion on ‘Failed’ Pixel
Camouflage . . . Because They ‘Wanted to Look Cooler than Marines,’ DAILY MAIL ONLINE (June
26, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2164686/How-U-S-Army-spent-5BIL-
LION-failed-pixel-camouflage—wanted-look-cooler-Marines.html (“Essentially, the Army
designed a universal uniform that universally failed in every environment.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
15 See, e.g., Kat Collings, The Complete Guide to Dressing for Your Body Type, WHO WHAT
WEAR (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.whowhatwear.com/how-to-dress-for-body-type-pear-
apple-hourglass; Kristin Larson, The Right Clothes for Your Body Type, REAL SIMPLE, http://
www.realsimple.com/beauty-fashion/clothing/shopping-guide/right-clothes-your-body-
type (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
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It is common knowledge that the placement of horizontal lines on a
garment can make the wearer look shorter and broader, while vertical lines
have the opposite effect of lengthening and slimming the wearer’s body.16
Garment design can visually minimize the size of body parts judged to be too
large by either appearing to subdivide those body parts or by counterbalanc-
ing them to increase the size of surrounding parts.17  For example, a V-
shaped neckline can make the neck look longer and narrower while also
making shoulder width narrower.18  A bodice can be smocked, pleated,
draped, or gathered at the bust to make the bust appear larger.19  Similarly,
as one design textbook indicates, “a line continuing around the body, diago-
nal stripes that are not too dominant, or a reflecting surface smoothly con-
touring the body call our attention to the rounded contours.”20
Designers can also affect the perception of the shape of body parts
through design choices.  Importantly for our purposes, the combination of
colors, shapes, and lines can have enormous influence on how the wearer’s
body is perceived.  This is known as color-blocking, and it was recently made
famous by Stella McCartney’s line of dresses, garment designs employing a
color-blocked hourglass appearance that made wearers’ bodies look both
curvier and slimmer.  Two examples of these dresses, as worn by actress Kate
Winslet, are shown in Figure 1.  The black color along the sides, which
changes in width at various points, produces a particularly striking hourglass
shape.21  And, in the dress on the right, the brighter color on the top of the
dress produces a larger and more defined bust.22
16 See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 36–41; Fan, supra note 10, at 11; J. Fan, Psychological
Comfort of Fabrics and Garments, in ENGINEERING APPAREL FABRICS AND GARMENTS 251, 257
tbl.9.1 (J. Fan & L. Hunter eds., 2009).
17 See Fan, supra note 10, at 11.
18 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 339.
19 Id. at 340.
20 DELONG, supra note 9, at 117.
21 See Saliha Agac¸ & Menekse Sakarya, Optical Illusions and Effects on Clothing Design, 3
INT’L J. SCI. CULTURE & SPORT 137, 154–55 (2015) (discussing this dress design).
22 Id.  For a related discussion of this dress design and the implications for the
copyrightability of fashion designs, see Marchese, supra note 2, at 406–07.
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Figure 1: Stella McCartney color-blocked dresses 23
Optical illusions can also be deployed in garment design to influence
perceptions of the wearer’s body.24  Consider the Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion, as
shown in Figure 2, which causes a line to look longer if it is bracketed on
each end by arrow tails and shorter if it is bracketed on each end by arrow
heads.25  This illusion can be incorporated into garment designs to lengthen
or contract the body of the wearer through placement of arrow tails or heads,
respectively, as shown in Figure 3.26
23 Fiona Raisbeck, Kate Winslet Wows in Another Body-Con Stella McCartney Dress, MARIE
CLAIRE (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.marieclaire.co.uk/news/fashion/532781/kate-winslet-
wows-in-another-body-con-stella-mccartney-dress.html#index=1.
24 See generally DAVIS, supra note 12, at 40–50; Agac¸ & Sakarya, supra note 21, at 137
(cataloguing various illusions to be used).
25 See Fan, supra note 16, at 257.
26 See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 40; Fan, supra note 16, at 257.
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Figure 2: Mu¨ller-Lyer Illusion 27
Figure 3: The Mu¨ller-Lyer Illusion Applied to Garment Design 28
To emphasize, or draw attention to, a particular body part, a garment
design can include a dominant design element over the body part that it
covers when the associated garment is worn.29  As two design experts explain
more generally, “emphasis can be achieved through strong contrasts in value,
but the contrast can also come about through bright intensities of color, unu-
sual shapes, the use of different textures, a boldness of size, or a juxtaposition
of contrasting lines.”30  Shapes are good candidates for producing emphasis,
especially when large, bold, and contrasted with their surroundings.31  Trian-
27 Patric Nordbeck, An Ecological Note on the Mu¨ller-Lyer Illusion, PSYPHI > SCIFI (Feb. 22,
2015), http://pnpsyphi.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/an-ecological-note-on-muller-lyer.html.
28 Agac¸ & Sakarya, supra note 21, at 143 fig.1.e.
29 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 26; HORN & GUREL, supra note 12, at 320–21.
30 HORN & GUREL, supra note 12, at 321.
31 See DELONG, supra note 9, at 183–84, 189, 244.
< > 
> < 
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gular shapes or folds in garment design can create visual emphasis by appear-
ing to converge and point at the part of the body covered by these shapes.32
The center front area of the body is often chosen for emphasis, drawing
attention there and reducing the effect of the volume of the entire body.33
These design techniques are not used just because they look attractive
on their own.  They are used to make the wearer look more attractive.  They
are part of what make designs inherently work as fashion designs.34  By taking
advantage of the nature of human vision, these design techniques alter the
way we see things in the world.35  As two designers explain, “By using art
components in this way, [designers] can alter the frame of reference in
which we see the human form, and in so doing, [they] can create illusions or
effects that would not be possible in any other way.”36  In this sense, they are
the same as camouflage or high-visibility patterns that serve a particular func-
tion.  Unlike a painting or a drawing of a cartoon character, they do not exist
merely to portray their own appearance or convey information.
As we argue in the following Part, the Copyright Act treats as functional
aspects of visual design that influence the perception of another object,
including the human body.  Accordingly, as a matter of copyright statute and
policy, the incorporation of design techniques that produce dependent value
are unprotectable.  Similarly, trademark and design patent laws must grapple
with the issue whether such functional aspects of fashion designs are unpro-
tectable.  We now address these laws in turn, beginning with copyright law.
II. FASHION’S FUNCTION IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Congress and the courts have long expressed concern about the misuse
of copyright law to protect functional objects from market competition.37
32 See id. at 244.
33 See id. at 124 (illustrating this effect with the use of Korean traditional dress).
34 According to Marian Davis:
A garment may have a purpose, or reason for being, in any or all three design
aspects.  Its functional, physical purpose may be to allow the wearer to ski com-
fortably and safely, to sit comfortably, or to move and survive in space.  Its struc-
tural purpose is to allow it to fit and to perform.  Decorative, visual purposes
might be to increase night visibility, or the attractiveness of the wearer, or to pro-
vide visual identification of a nurse or policeman, qualities that can only be seen.
DAVIS, supra note 12, at 15.
35 Justin Hughes discusses how trademarks take advantage of features of the human
cognitive apparatus. See Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark
Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2015).
36 HORN & GUREL, supra note 12, at 314.
37 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
101–06 (1879); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54–55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5667–68; J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From
the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143 (discussing history
of American legal protection of design); cf. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23, 28–35 (2001) (elaborating on trademark law’s statutory prohibition on protecting
functional matter, and the existence of a utility patent on that matter being strong evi-
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The fashion industry, in particular, has proven a consistent source of conster-
nation in this regard.38  Over a century ago, one court explained that “a man-
ufacturer of unpatented articles cannot practically monopolize their sale by
copyrighting a catalogue containing illustrations of them.”39  As the Star
Athletica case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court40 indicates, many
in the fashion industry are still seeking haven for their designs within copy-
right law.  In this Part, we review the general structure of the copyright-patent
divide in intellectual property law and the doctrinal techniques that copy-
right law has historically used to screen out functional content.  We then set
out how copyright law and policy lead to the conclusion that fashion design
features that affect the perception of the wearer are not protectable.
A. The Separate Spheres of Copyright and Patent Laws
In the United States, copyright and patent laws share the same constitu-
tional grounding.  The U.S. Constitution grants Congress power “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”41  Typically, this language is read to establish separate domains
dence of such functionality); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (deeming a fashion industry organization’s attempts to stop garment design piracy
to be anticompetitive in contravention of the Sherman Act, and emphasizing that copy-
right law, as it existed at the time, did not allow the prevention of such privacy); Nat’l
Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard Mail Order Co., 191 F. 528, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (“[A] manu-
facturer of unpatented articles cannot practically monopolize their sale by copyrighting a
catalogue containing illustrations of them.  From a comparison of the illustrations upon
which complainant relies, the fair inference would seem to be that defendant makes some
garments which are identical with complainant’s and offers them for sale.”).
38 See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild, 312 U.S. 457 (deeming efforts to stop garment
design piracy a violation of the Sherman Act, and emphasizing that copyright law, as it
then existed, did not provide a basis for preventing such piracy).  The relationship
between intellectual property law and the fashion industry has garnered substantial schol-
arly attention. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005)
(suggesting when producers will tolerate counterfeiting); Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property
Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 810 (2010) (evaluating “intellectual
property law’s emerging role as a modern form of sumptuary law”); C. Scott Hemphill &
Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009) (argu-
ing for a limited right against copying); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006)
(arguing that the lack of IP protection for fashion tends to both enable trends and speed
up their obsolescence).
39 Nat’l Cloak & Suit Co., 191 F. at 528.
40 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  For more on the history of this provision, see Jeanne C.
Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012);
Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation
on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006).
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for copyright law and patent law.42  Congress’s implementations of copyright
and patent laws follows this conventional divide: Copyright law protects
authors’ writings, while patent law protects inventors’ discoveries.43  Put
another way, copyright law is the province of expression and aesthetics, while
patent law is the province of utility and functionality.44  Both fields seek to
optimize creative production within their spheres, but they both adopt very
different legal mechanisms to do so.
Patents can confer substantial market power on their owners, enabling
them to charge higher prices for access to the protected technology than
they otherwise would.45  These higher prices and diminished market compe-
tition are deemed worthwhile, however, because they provide valuable incen-
tives to invest in creating and disseminating new and useful technologies.46
The world is a better place, so the story goes, when inventors are given incen-
tives to develop and disclose their inventions, even if this comes at the cost of
higher prices.47  But not all “inventions” are worth this tradeoff.  Patent law
establishes relatively high standards for obtaining its protection.  Inventors
who desire patent rights must submit to an expensive patent examination by
the Patent and Trademark Office of their inventions’ utility, novelty, and
nonobviousness.48  This means that the inventions had never existed before
and that other people in the relevant field would not easily have thought of
them if they had tried.  Only 75% of utility patents get granted, and the pro-
42 See Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 421 (2009) (indicating that this is the conventional reading, but proposing that it is
wrong); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power To Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ash-
croft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing issues of constitutional interpretation of the
Copyright Clause before the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)).  On
the constitutional foundations of design patents, see Ralph D. Clifford & Richard J. Peltz-
Steele, The Constitutionality of Design Patents, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 553 (2015).
43 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (stating that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” and listing as
“[w]orks of authorship,” among other things, “literary works” and “pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works”), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and use-
ful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).
44 See Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229
(2016); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441
(2010).
45 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 996–97 (1997).
46 Id. at 993–96.
47 Id.
48 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 131.  See generally Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C.
Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Prop-
erty Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2014) (exploring, via experimentation,
how varying creativity thresholds affects creativity in different artistic and scientific
domains); David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
677 (2012) (analyzing the differential screening for protectability in patent and copyright
laws); Fromer, supra note 44, at 1483–1508 (probing the differences in patent and copy-
right laws’ protectability thresholds).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 13 15-NOV-17 13:45
2017] fashion’s  function 63
cedure typically costs $22,000.49  Moreover, once granted, patent protection
lasts only for twenty years from the application date.50
Contrast this situation with copyright law.  Although the term of protec-
tion was a fairly short maximum of twenty-eight years under the first copy-
right statute,51 copyright protection now lasts for much longer than does
patent protection.  Authors typically receive copyright protection in their
works for their entire lives plus an additional 70 years post-mortem.52  In
addition, copyrights are extraordinarily easy to obtain.  Under the 1976 Act,
copyright vests without need for further action at the moment that a work is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression—as soon as it is filmed, drawn, or
written down.53  In contrast to the Patent and Trademark Office, the Copy-
right Office plays little to no role in screening out inappropriate claims to
protection.54  Moreover, to be protectable works do not need to be novel and
nonobvious, but rather only “original,” that is, independently created and
that they exhibit a very modest creative spark.55  This threshold is much
lower than the one imposed by patent law.56
In light of the differences between obtaining patents and copyrights,
there is a sizeable risk that creators will attempt to use copyright law to obtain
“backdoor patents.”57  Patent law allows inventors to protect functional cre-
ations and to obtain competitive advantages, but only upon showing that they
have made a meaningful contribution to scientific or technological progress.
Accordingly, to ensure that creators do not take advantage of its lower protec-
tion thresholds and longer duration, copyright law imposes screening mecha-
49 Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687,
695, 700 (2010).
50 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
51 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
52 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
53 See id. § 102(a).
54 One can—and has incentive to—register copyrights with the Copyright Office. Id.
§§ 409–412; Dotan Oliar, Nathaniel Pattison & K. Ross Powell, Copyright Registrations: Who,
What, When, Where, and Why, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2211, 2215–19 (2014).  The Copyright Office
can refuse registration, but that is no bar to statutory protection when courts understand
copyright law contrary to the Copyright Office. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979
F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (granting copyright protection to video game after Copyright
Office had refused registration).
55 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47
(1991).
56 See Buccafusco, Burns, Fromer & Sprigman, supra note 48, at 1926–31.
57 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“The novelty of the art or thing
described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright.  To give to the
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examina-
tion of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the
public.  That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.  The claim to an invention
or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent
Office before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a
patent from the government.”); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The
Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473 (2004).
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nisms that exclude functional works and features from protection.  The
Supreme Court’s foundational copyright decision in Baker v. Selden58 refuses
to allow authors to use copyright law to obtain backdoor patent protection
for the useful objects or methods described in their expressive works, such as
manuals or scientific articles.59  The copyright statute codifies this holding:
“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”60
Courts have applied this exclusionary rule in many contexts, including
importantly to exclude from copyright protection crucial aspects of com-
puter software that are dictated by efficiency, hardware specifications, and,
more broadly, anything that extends beyond the expressive aspects of the
code to its functional aspects.61  Pertinently, because copyright law refuses to
allow backdoor patents, courts apply the merger doctrine to find expression
uncopyrightable when there is only one or a very limited number of ways to
express a function.62  In these cases, protecting the expression would essen-
tially provide copyright coverage to the function, so the merger doctrine
treats the function and expression as merged, rendering the expression just
as uncopyrightable as the function.63  On the same basis, courts also find
such functionally constrained expression to be one of the few categories of
expression that fail to meet copyright’s low threshold of originality.64
Although virtually all areas of copyright are at risk of improperly protect-
ing functional content, these concerns are heightened for certain two- and
three-dimensional works.  Copyright law has taken a targeted approach to
excluding functional aspects of these “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works,”65 which we discuss and for which we offer an analytical framework in
the next Section.
58 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
59 Id. at 102–04.
60 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
61 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d. Cir. 1992); see
also Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6.
62 See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
535–38 (6th Cir. 2004).
63 See, e.g., id. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64
EMORY L.J. 71 (2014) (explaining the merger doctrine as part of an information theory of
copyright law); Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 417 (2016) (reviewing 150 judicial opinions discussing or applying the
merger doctrine in copyright law).  For the same reason, courts find no infringement when
the defendant’s work copies unprotected functional matter. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l,
982 F.2d at 707–10.
64 Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d at 537–41.
65 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
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B. Screening Functionality in Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works
The design of an automobile will often be aesthetically pleasing.66  Yet
the design will also affect the car’s aerodynamics and fuel efficiency.67  To
the extent that copyright law protects the aesthetic features of the design, it
risks also protecting utilitarian function, the province of patent law.  Consis-
tent with this concern, Congress established a general rule against copyright
protection for so-called “useful article[s],” subject to a narrow exception for
expressive features of a useful article that are separable from its functional
aspects.68
Specifically, the Copyright Act provides that “[p]ictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works” include “works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”69  Further, the
design of a work that constitutes a “useful article” is protectable “only if, and
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”70  In short, to
be protectable a product design must exhibit expressive “pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural features” (we refer to these as “expressive” features throughout)
that are separable from its “utilitarian aspects.”71  If a useful article has no
expressive features or if the expressive features are inseparable from its utili-
tarian aspects, it should not receive copyright protection.
Congress was aware that this rule meant many useful works that are visu-
ally appealing would be unprotected by copyright, but it considered this
appropriate in light of the risks to competition posed by more expansive cop-
yright protection and the availability of design patents for industrial
designs.72  Congress concluded that leaving some works with expressive fea-
tures unprotected by copyright was preferable to allowing functional objects
to gain lengthy legal protection while avoiding the high inventive threshold
and careful examination of the patent system.73
Before discussing copyright law’s treatment of garment designs, it is
essential to understand how copyright law has handled the challenge of sepa-
66 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5668; SARAH SCHLEUNING & KEN GROSS, DREAM CARS: INNOVATIVE DESIGN, VISIONARY IDEAS
(2014).
67 See, e.g., THOMAS SCHUETZ, AERODYNAMICS OF ROAD VEHICLES (5th ed. 2015).
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
69 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 49–50, 54–55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5662–63, 5667–68; see Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007
(2017) (“Congress has provided copyright protection for original works of art, but not for
industrial designs.”); supra Section II.A.
73 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 49–50, 54–55; see supra Section II.A; cf. Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“The claim to an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture
must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right therein
can be obtained . . . .”).
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rating form and function more generally.  When dealing with pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, copyright law distinguishes between those works
that constitute “useful articles” and those that do not.  According to the Act,
a useful article is “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”74
This definition is vitally important to understanding copyright law’s
treatment of functionality, and it has two essential purposes.  First, the defini-
tion explains that only those works that have an intrinsic utilitarian function
should be treated as useful articles.  “Intrinsic” in this sense means inherent
or essential.75  The Act differentiates between works that essentially have at
least one function and those that do not essentially have any function—that
is, those that are essentially expressive.
Second, the definition clarifies how to determine whether some charac-
teristic of a work should be treated as functional or expressive.  Aspects of a
work that “merely . . . portray the appearance of the article or . . . convey
information” are not functional aspects of the work.76  They are, instead,
expressive features.  This distinction is necessary to effectuate the statutory
requirement that
the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.77
Consider a copyright claim in an original painting.  A painting is clearly
a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work,” so we must then decide whether the
painting is a “useful article.”  The answer, in virtually all cases, is that it is not
a useful article.  Most paintings do not have an intrinsic utilitarian function.
Instead, they exist to portray their own appearance.  When we think about
why most paintings are painted and why they are valued by consumers, we
focus on their representational characteristics.78  Indeed, virtually all of the
decisions that an artist makes about the content of a painting are concerned
with representational or depictive ends.  This is not to say that a painting can
have no function.  It may successfully cover a hole in the wall, in much the
same way that a book can serve as a doorstop.  Yet this sort of utilitarian
74 17 U.S.C. § 101.
75 See, e.g., Intrinsic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “intrinsic” as
“[b]elonging to a thing by its very nature; not dependent on external circumstances; inher-
ent; essential”).
76 17 U.S.C. § 101.
77 Id.
78 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 490 (6th Cir. 2015); cf.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) (“[P]ainting and
engraving unless for a mechanical end are not among the useful arts, the progress of which
Congress is empowered by the Constitution to promote.”).  Below we discuss the relation-
ship between creators and consumers in the determination of a work’s functional features.
See infra subsection II.C.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 17 15-NOV-17 13:45
2017] fashion’s  function 67
function is one that is shared by all physical objects and is thus not intrinsic,
or essential, to a painting or a book in any meaningful way.  This sort of
nonintrinsic functionality does not magically make paintings or other picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural works intrinsically utilitarian.  Most paintings,
then, are by application of the copyright statute, not useful articles.
Now consider the design of a stylish bicycle rack.79  Although the design
may have significant aesthetic features and although it may have won awards
for the quality of its design, the bicycle rack has an intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion: to hold bicycles securely.  The rack was made to hold bicycles, and it is
purchased by consumers who want to use it for that purpose.  This use is
obviously different from typical copyrightable expression, which merely por-
trays the appearance of an article or conveys information.  Similarly, the
designs of “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural” objects like mannequins, floor
tiles, and, of course, garments, are useful articles.  They each have an intrin-
sic function beyond “portray[ing] the appearance of the article or . . . con-
vey[ing] information.”80  They are, as “useful articles,” then subject to a
rigorous separability analysis to determine whether they can support a valid
copyright.
The copyright statute sets out that
the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article.81
This language indicates that Congress intended to extend copyright pro-
tection only to some components of a limited class of useful articles—their
separable “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural” (expressive) features.  The first
step in a separability analysis, then, must involve determining which compo-
nents of a work are its expressive features and which are its utilitarian aspects.
A court cannot determine whether the former are separable from the latter
until it has determined which are which.82
This inquiry has been the key component to successful application of
the useful articles doctrine in fashion design and elsewhere.  In effect, a
court is asked to parse the various features of a design and to characterize
each of those features.  The Copyright Act specifically contemplates that a
79 See, for example, the bicycle rack denied copyrightability in Brandir International,
Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
80 17 U.S.C. § 101.
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Star Athletica, 799 F.3d at 490–91; Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods.,
Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 932 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting) (“[T]he statute requires, on
its face, that sculptural features must be separately identified from the utilitarian aspects of
the article.”).  In fact, as we discuss below, we think the Supreme Court erred in its Star
Athletica decision by failing to categorize the design’s features, which led in turn to a flawed
outcome in the case. See infra Part III.
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particular design component can fall into one of the three categories like we
described in Part I:
(1) only pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (or “expressive”);
(2) only utilitarian (or functional); or
(3) both expressive and utilitarian.
The first two categories are straightforward.  They encompass design fea-
tures that are either purely expressive or purely utilitarian, respectively.  A
cartoon character screen-printed on the front of a t-shirt is likely to be purely
expressive, for example, while the shape of an internal part of an automotive
engine is purely functional.
The existence and content of the third category may seem less clear, but
the statute undoubtedly recognizes the existence of dual-nature components,
and it explains how they should be treated.  On its face, the Copyright Act
recognizes the existence of what we call dual-nature components by acknowl-
edging that there are “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features” that cannot
“be identified separately from” the “utilitarian aspects of the article.”83  This
language indicates that a component of a design, such as the leg of a chair,
may be simultaneously expressive and functional.  The back of an Eames
chair is both a brilliant work of visual design and a terrific example of func-
tional ergonomic engineering.84
Indeed, the fundamental justification for the useful articles doctrine has
been to exclude from copyright protection aspects of works that exhibit both
expression and function.85  There would be little need for separability analy-
sis if all components of a design could be designated as either expressive or
functional, because copyright law could simply indicate that only the expres-
sive features are protectable.  Separability analysis exists precisely because
design aspects that are expressive can—and, as discussed in the previous Part,
in the case of clothing often will—serve utilitarian purposes.
Until the Supreme Court recently ruled on separability in Star Athletica,
Congress and lower courts recognized two forms of separability—physical
and conceptual—that could form the basis of valid copyrights.86  Physical
separability existed, straightforwardly, when an expressive pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural feature could be physically removed from an otherwise useful
83 17 U.S.C. § 101.
84 See JOHN R. BERRY, HERMAN MILLER: THE PURPOSE OF DESIGN 85 (2004).
85 Copyright law cannot both protect the expressive features of the uniforms and pre-
serve their functional aspects from protection when they are the same. Cf. Morrissey v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that copyright does
not protect expression whose associated idea can be expressed in very few ways, so that the
idea effectively merges with the expression, for the reason that in such cases copyright
would then unreasonably protect ideas); Samuelson, supra note 63, at 417.
86 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668
(“Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set,
or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can
be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not
be copyrighted . . . .”).
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article without affecting the article’s utility.87  For example, an expressive
hood ornament is typically physically separable from the utilitarian automo-
bile to which it is attached.88  Conceptual separability had been less clear-cut,
leading courts and scholars to have articulated varying tests to ascertain it.89
Typically, these cases had involved situations in which the expressive and
functional aspects of the design are more intimately related.  Even though
the expressive features could not be simply ripped off of the useful article,
they may have nonetheless been protectable in certain circumstances.  Under
what circumstances, then, could the pictorial, graphic, and sculptural fea-
tures of a design be conceived separately from and exist independently of the
design’s functional aspects?  In the past, for example, courts held to be con-
ceptually separable—and therefore copyrightable—the ornamental features
of belt buckles90 and a mannequin face.91  By contrast, courts held not to be
separable plastic torsos used to display clothing,92 a bicycle rack,93 and casino
uniform designs.94
In sum, it is essential to the policies underlying both copyright and pat-
ent laws that copyright law distinguish expression from function in determin-
ing protectability.  Congress sought to do that with the useful articles
doctrine by analyzing whether a useful article’s expressive features are separa-
ble from its functional aspects.  We now turn to how to think about fashion
designs within this context.
C. The Functionality of Garment Design Features
Copyright law’s useful articles doctrine is intended to handle cases
involving works that incorporate both expression and function.  Applying
this doctrine to fashion designs has proved especially challenging to courts,
as they try to sort and separate the aspects of garments that are expressive
from those that are functional.  In this Part, we offer a robust approach to
understanding the nature of fashion’s functionality.  Our approach is
grounded in the current copyright statute and responds to the Supreme
87 Star Athletica, 799 F.3d at 481–82 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.2(A) (3d ed. 2014)).
88 Id.
89 See id. at 484–85 (listing nine different tests and describing a circuit split with regard
to them).
90 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that the ornamental features of the belt buckles were conceptually separable
“sculptural elements” because these features are “primary” to the buckle’s “subsidiary utili-
tarian function”).
91 Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004).
92 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418–19 (2d Cir. 1985)
(explaining that the expressive features were not conceptually separable because they were
objectively necessary to the performance of the torsos’ utilitarian function of displaying
actual clothing on a human-like torso).
93 Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146–47 (2d Cir.
1987).
94 Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419–22 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Court’s recent Star Athletica decision.  Correctly applied, it appropriately lim-
its the scope of copyright protection for garment design to only those fea-
tures that are purely expressive.  According to our approach, components of
a garment design should be treated as functional not only if they are mechan-
ically or technologically functional, but also if they are valued for their ability
to influence the way that the wearer is perceived.  These components are
prevalent in fashion design, and even if they are also expressive, must be
screened out of any copyright protection granted to an author.  We explain
the analysis below.
To analyze the copyrightability of fashion designs, or for that matter any
ostensibly useful article, one must ask and answer a series of questions.  The
first step of the relevant inquiry is whether the works at issue are pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works.  Fashion designs are “pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works.”95  They qualify as such when they are design drawings as
“two-dimensional . . . works of . . . graphic . . . art,” and any resulting gar-
ments made from those designs ought to be characterized as “sculptural
works,” or “three-dimensional works of . . . art.”96
Given that garment designs are properly characterized as pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, the second relevant question is whether the
designs are for “useful articles.”  According to the copyright statute, separa-
bility analysis is required to assess copyrightability only for pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works that qualify as useful articles.97  Garments and their
designs fall squarely within the statutory definition of a “useful article”: “an
article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information.”98  As discussed in Part I,
garments are meant to be worn and when worn are meant to provide
warmth, modesty, and performance for a range of purposes.99
Note that even though a drawing of a dress is not necessarily itself a
useful article, the copyright in the drawing does not extend protection to the
95 See, e.g., Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 489 (6th Cir. 2015)
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”).
97 Id.; see also Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir.
1997) (emphasizing that the separability test for useful articles that are sculptural works
has no application for literary works).
98 17 U.S.C. § 101.
99 See also Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550–51
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the function of a prom dress, for example, is to cover the
body in an attractive way for a special occasion); DAVIS, supra note 12, at 17, 19 (indicating,
for example, that “clothing can protect against extreme temperatures, wind, moisture,
radiation, insects and other creatures, thorns, fungi and bacteria, plant secretions, chemi-
cals, excessive friction, and the like,” and that “[c]lothing for active sports must provide
protection, comfort, absorbency, and freedom of movement, as well as visual identifica-
tion”); 2 PATRY, supra note 14, § 3:151 (discussing how features of a garment like the
shapes of the neckline, sleeves, skirt shape, trouser cut, or pockets are design elements
inextricably connected with the utilitarian aspects of clothing: pockets store pencils or
pens; pants and skirts cover the legs; shirts cover the torso modestly or less modestly
depending on the neckline).
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creation of a three-dimensional dress that would be a useful article.100  Sec-
tion 113(b) of the Copyright Act explains that “the owner of copyright in a
work that portrays a useful article” does not obtain “any greater or lesser
rights . . . to the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so por-
trayed than those afforded to such works under the law.”101  So, for example,
an artist who draws a picture of a car may obtain a copyright in her drawing
and prevent others from copying the drawing in their own drawings, but her
copyright does not give her the exclusive right to produce actual functional
cars based on her drawing.102  Similarly, the creator of the “The Man with
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b); see also Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
1002, 1013 n.2 (2017) (“A drawing of a shovel could, of course, be copyrighted.  And, if the
shovel included any artistic features that could be perceived as art apart from the shovel,
and which would qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works on their own
or in another medium, they too could be copyrighted.  But a shovel as a shovel cannot.”);
id. at 1033 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The law has long recognized that drawings or photo-
graphs of real world objects are copyrightable as drawings or photographs, but the copy-
right does not give protection against others making the underlying useful objects.  That is
why a copyright on Van Gogh’s painting would prevent others from reproducing that
painting, but it would not prevent others from reproducing and selling the comfortable
old shoes that the painting depicts.” (citation omitted)); cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
103 (1879) (“The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and
illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing described,
though they may never have been known or used before.  By publishing the book, without
getting a patent for the art, the latter is given to the public.  The fact that the art described
in the book by illustrations of lines and figures which are reproduced in practice in the
application of the art, makes no difference.  Those illustrations are the mere language
employed by the author to convey his ideas more clearly.  Had he used words of descrip-
tion instead of diagrams (which merely stand in the place of words), there could not be the
slightest doubt that others, applying the art to practical use, might lawfully draw the lines
and diagrams which were in the author’s mind, and which he thus described by words in
his book.”).
101 17 U.S.C. § 113(b).
102 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010 (“Nor could someone claim a copyright in a useful
article merely by creating a replica of that article in some other medium—for example, a
cardboard model of a car.  Although the replica could itself be copyrightable, it would not
give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.”).  In DC Comics v. Towle, 802
F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of
a lawsuit brought by copyright owners of the Batmobile as it was visually depicted in Bat-
man comic books, television programs, and movies against a manufacturer of replica kits
that attach to actual automobiles to make them look like the Batmobile. See id. at 1027.
The court, wrongly in our view, failed to consider whether the copyright in the depiction
of a useful article like an automobile could extend protection to the production of actual
car parts. See generally id. The district court had addressed this question and found that
because many of the Batmobile’s functional elements were not functional in the real world,
they were not useful.  DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948, 969–70 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
It had also found that the design of the bat logos, hubcaps, and the car’s frame were
separable “artistic feature[s]” of the design. Id. at 970.  Although the Batmobile may have
had separable features that entitled it to copyright protection under the useful articles
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit did not discuss separability. See generally DC Comics, 802 F.3d
1012.
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the Yellow Hat” character in Curious George receives copyright protection for
the drawing of the character.103  This copyright would give the author the
exclusive right to depict the character in other two-dimensional media,
including cartoons and movies, and even to create three-dimensional sculp-
tures or toys based on the character.104  That copyright, however, would not
extend to the production of actual yellow hats, because hats are useful arti-
cles without separable copyrightable features.  Clearly, allowing artists to
secure intellectual property protection for functional objects simply because
they draw them would subvert the whole purpose of patent law’s stringent
novelty, nonobviousness, and examination requirements.105
Because garment designs are useful articles, they are subjected to the
separability analysis discussed above.106  As noted above, the most important
step in this analysis involves the identification and categorization of the com-
ponents of a claimed design.  A court must determine which components of
the design are purely expressive, which are purely functional, and which are
dual-nature—that is, that they simultaneously affect the aesthetics and the
utility of the garment.
We think that the Copyright Act treats aspects of garment design that
influence the perception of the wearer’s body as “utilitarian features” of a
useful article, although they may also be expressive “pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural” aspects of the article.  The reason is that the copyright statute
defines a useful article as one having “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
103 See H.A. REY & MARGRET REY, CURIOUS GEORGE (1941).
104 Toys are not necessarily considered “useful articles” under the Copyright Act. See,
e.g., Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[A] toy airplane is
merely a model which portrays a real airplane.  To be sure, a toy airplane is to be played
with and enjoyed, but a painting of an airplane, which is copyrightable, is to be looked at
and enjoyed.  Other than the portrayal of a real airplane, a toy airplane, like a painting, has
no intrinsic utilitarian function.”).
105 See supra Section II.A.  This understanding of § 113(b) is not contrary to § 113(a),
which provides that “[s]ubject to the provisions of subsection[ ] (b) . . . of this section, the
exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in cop-
ies . . . includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful
or otherwise.”  17 U.S.C. § 113(a).  The reason that § 113(a) does not permit owners of a
copyright in a drawing of a dress to make that dress if it is a useful article lacking in separa-
bility is that § 113(a) is subject to § 113(b), which forbids such an extension of copyright
law to cover useful articles.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Star Athletica, which purports
to be an exercise in statutory interpretation, focuses on § 113(a) to the exclusion of
§ 113(b), despite Congress’s explicit limitation of § 113(a) by § 113(b).  The majority
opinion does not even mention § 113(b), despite otherwise quoting from § 113(a). See
generally Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002.  That leads the Supreme Court to interpret § 113(a)
erroneously to mean that
[t]he ultimate separability question, then, is whether the feature for which copy-
right protection is claimed would have been eligible for copyright protection as a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work had it originally been fixed in some tangible
medium other than a useful article before being applied to a useful article.
Id. at 1011 (referring to § 113(a) as a basis for this interpretation).
106 See supra Section II.B.
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not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”107  As
discussed in the previous section, the Act distinguishes between useful article
features that “merely portray the appearance of the article or . . . convey
information” and useful article features that have additional utility.  By this
distinction, an aspect of a useful article that “merely . . . portray[s] [its]
appearance . . . or . . . convey[s] information” is not considered a utilitarian
feature.  It is purely an expression of authorship.108  By contrast, an aspect of
a useful article that does not merely portray its appearance or convey infor-
mation is a utilitarian feature of that article.
The statute itself thereby defines when an article or an article’s design
feature has a utilitarian function.  It should be apparent that this statutory
specification defines expressive—or pictorial, graphic, or sculptural—fea-
tures restrictively.  By the statute’s terms, an expressive feature cannot have a
purpose other than—or additional to—portraying its own appearance or
conveying information.  Otherwise, it is utilitarian.  For this reason, as we dis-
cuss in greater detail in Section II.D, dual-nature features as discussed in the
previous section are statutorily utilitarian, not expressive.
In the context of the useful articles doctrine, the Copyright Act estab-
lishes a distinction between aspects of designs that are valued inherently for
their depictive effect and those whose value is dependent on their effect on other
objects.  The former it treats as expressive “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features,” and the latter it treats as “utilitarian aspects.”109  Inherently valua-
ble design elements alone may be treated as purely expressive features of a
work.  Elements that are dependently valuable for their ability to affect the
perception of another object are (at least partly) functional, because they do
not exist merely to portray their own appearance or convey information.  For
garments, this dependent visual utility represents an additional way in which
aspects of garment design can be utilitarian.  In addition to the mechanical
utility related to use, warmth, and modesty, garments have additional utility
under the copyright statute when they incorporate design features that influ-
ence the wearer’s appearance.110
Consider how different sorts of visual figures might be incorporated into
the design of a garment.  On the one hand, a drawing of a cartoon character
on a t-shirt is inherently valuable.  It is produced and consumed for the rep-
107 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
108 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2015).
Conveying information and portraying appearances are characteristic aspects of copyright-
able authorship. See generally Buccafusco, supra note 44; Fromer, supra note 63.
109 17 U.S.C. § 101.
110 Cf. Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 F. App’x 42, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2012)
(observing that a prom dress can function as such only when it can “cover the body in a
particularly attractive way for [a] special occasion”); Elastic Wonder, Inc. v. Posey, 179 F.
Supp. 3d 307, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“It is the functional purpose of covering the body in an
attractive and comfortable way that motivates the designs of fittings of certain shapes, and
the utilitarian function of the leggings as clothing is primary over the ornamental aspect.”);
Fan, supra note 10, at 1.
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resentation it provides.111  The drawing of the character plays the same role
and has the same effect whether it is on a piece of paper, a digital device
screen, or a garment.  On the other hand are useful article designs that are
primarily dependently valuable.  They produce value when brought into
appropriate relationships with other objects, and in terms of their effects on
those objects: making them look bigger, smaller, different, or better.  Camou-
flage offers an ideal example of designs at this end of the spectrum, of those
having dependent value.  The design of a camouflage pattern achieves its
value when it is placed in an appropriate environment.  When it is, the pat-
tern works: it functions to cloak the person or object that it covers.112  Con-
sider, by comparison, the two camouflage patterns in Figure 4.  The
camouflage pattern on the left was worn by soldiers in the U.S. Army
deployed in Afghanistan to cloak them well against their surroundings,
whereas the camouflage pattern on the right, worn by North Korean soldiers,
does not cloak them, but if anything, makes them easier to see.
Figure 4: Effective and Ineffective Camouflage 113
When a design element, like an effective camouflage pattern, alters the
way another object appears, that is, when it works in relation to some other
111 Recall that paintings and many other visual designs such as drawings and sculptures
will almost never be properly categorized as useful articles in the first instance because they
lack “intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the arti-
cle or to convey information.”  17 U.S.C. § 101; supra Section II.B.  They are therefore not
useful articles subject, in the first instance, to separability analysis of their features.  Even if
for some reason they were, we would likely conclude for much the same reason that most
drawings, paintings, and sculptures are inherently valuable, because they are produced and
consumed for the representations they provide, much like a sports team’s logo on a t-shirt.
112 See, e.g., Isla Forsyth, Subversive Patterning: The Surficial Qualities of Camouflage, 45
ENV’T & PLANNING 1037 (2013).  As with the painting, this is not the only value of camou-
flage.  Camouflage is regularly incorporated into items with no intention of masking their
appearance.  Yet this does not undermine the fact that camouflage is in many cases pro-
duced and consumed for the effect it has on objects.
113 The figure on the left can be found in Army Selects New Camouflage for Afghanistan,
SPACEWAR (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Army_Selects_New_Camou
flage_For_Afghanistan_999.html, whereas the figure on the right can be found in Brian
Ashcraft, North Korean Camo Actually Isn’t That Awful, KOTAKU (Oct. 31, 2013), http://
kotaku.com/north-korean-camo-actually-isnt-that-awful-1455805558.
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object, that design element should be treated as utilitarian as a matter of
copyright law.114  That is, the design element is “not merely . . . portray[ing]
the appearance of the article or . . . convey[ing] information.”115  Only if a
design or an aspect of design exists merely to portray its own appearance
should it be treated by copyright law as purely expressive.116  One such exam-
ple would be an image of a character, such as Mickey Mouse, printed on a t-
shirt.  The character exists merely to portray its own appearance.  The prior
example of a paisley print on a necktie might also satisfy this requirement.
Nor is a design element, like an effective camouflage pattern, which
alters the way another object appears, “merely . . . convey[ing] informa-
tion.”117  That is, one might argue that the design element is conveying false
information, such as a wearer’s absence or invisibility in the case of an effec-
tive camouflage garment design being worn.  And furthermore, in this vein,
false information is as much information as accurate information.  Even if it
is the case that it is false, or inaccurate, information is information—some-
thing that runs contrary to some understandings of “information”118—these
design elements do not “merely” convey information.  They act dependently
by being used on some external element to make it appear differently.  That
is distinct from the effect of a book comprising only lies presented as truth,
which one might understand to “merely . . . convey information” (assuming
one construes “information” broadly).  Any design element being used to
change the appearance of something external to it, however, does more than
just convey information by directly affecting the appearance of that external
thing.119
114 Cf. Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (finding no copyright
infringement when the U.S. government produced camouflage parachutes from the plain-
tiff’s design showing top and side views of a similar parachute because finding otherwise
would be akin to conferring unwarranted patent protection), cited in Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 217 n.39 (1954).
115 17 U.S.C. § 101.
116 See id. (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.  An article
that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful article.’”).
117 Id.
118 For example, one dictionary defines “information” as having multiple senses,
including “facts, data,” which would seem to require accuracy, and “the communication or
reception of knowledge or intelligence,” which might be understood more broadly to not
require accuracy.  Information, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/information (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
119 The suggestion that graphic visual designs attached to a garment “convey informa-
tion” rather than “portray [an] appearance” is an unnatural reading of the statutory text.
If, for example, a designer printed a brand name or other textual material on a garment,
the text might accurately be understood as conveying information.  But one does not typi-
cally refer to visual depictions as conveying information; instead, they portray appearances.
So, when a claimed design such as a camouflage pattern is essentially a matter of pictorial
or graphic patterns or images, we think it makes more sense to ask whether these patterns
or images merely portray the appearance of the article.
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In light of this discussion, we wish to respond to two lines of argument
that might be raised to challenge our reading of the Copyright Act: the claim
by some courts and scholars that two-dimensional design features are always
nonfunctional, which the Supreme Court recently rejected, and the claim
that our interpretation of the Act would treat paintings and other works of
fine art as uncopyrightable because they “function” to decorate a room.  We
also propose that functionality ought to be assessed through the lens of both
expert and consumer views.
1. When Two-Dimensional Designs Are Functional and When They Are
Not
It is important to note that expressive techniques that affect the percep-
tion of the wearer—and are thus also functional—include both three-dimen-
sional design choices involving the shape and cut of garments as well as two-
dimensional design choices involving shapes, colors, and patterns.  This is
essential because some courts and scholars have often reflexively treated two-
dimensional fabric designs as nonfunctional.120  Yet both two- and three-
dimensional design features will often be utilitarian in nature.  As discussed
above, camouflage offers an obvious example of a functional two-dimen-
sional pattern.121  If the developer of a new camouflage pattern desires intel-
lectual property protection, she must look to the patent system, as some
camouflage designers (including the U.S. military itself) have done.122  High-
visibility fabrics or patterns are also functional, even though they are two-
dimensional.  And the techniques discussed above in Part I use two-dimen-
120 See Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005); 1 MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B][3] (rev. ed. 2017); 2
PATRY, supra note 14, § 3:151.
121 See supra text accompanying note 113; cf. Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021
(Ct. Cl. 1952) (finding no copyright infringement when the U.S. government produced
camouflage parachutes from the plaintiff’s design showing top and side views of a similar
parachute because finding otherwise would be akin to conferring unwarranted patent pro-
tection), cited in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 n.39 (1954).
122 For a sampling of utility patents covering camouflage designs, see U.S. Patent No.
6,805,957 (issued Oct. 19, 2004) (“Camouflage U.S. Marine Corps Utility Uniform: Pattern,
Fabric, and Design”); U.S. Patent No. 6,499,141 (issued Dec. 31, 2002) (“Multidimensional
Camouflage Outer Wear Garment System”); U.S. Patent No. 5,445,863 (issued Aug. 29,
1995) (“Camouflage Material”); U.S. Patent No. 4,931,320 (issued June 5, 1990) (“Camou-
flage Construction”); U.S. Patent No. 4,656,065 (issued Apr. 7, 1987) (“Bark Camouflage
Cloth and Outer Garments”); U.S. Patent No. 4,576,904 (issued Mar. 18, 1986) (“Method
for Developing Natural Camouflage Patterns”) (assigned to the United States of America
as represented by the Secretary of the Army); U.S. Patent No. 3,069,796 (issued Dec. 25,
1962) (“Camouflage Material”).  For a sampling of design patents covering camouflage
designs, see U.S. Patent No. D700,440 (issued Mar. 4, 2014) (“Camouflage Pattern”); U.S.
Patent No. D685,999 (issued July 16, 2013) (“Sheet Material with Camouflage Pattern”);
U.S. Patent No. D670,058 (issued Oct. 30, 2012) (“Combined Boot and Glove Dryer”); U.S.
Patent No. D615,762 (issued May 18, 2010) (“Substrate with Camouflage Pattern”); U.S.
Patent No. D560,915 (issued Feb. 5, 2008) (“Substrate with Camouflage Pattern”).
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sional patterns in similar ways, by altering how the viewer sees the clothed
person.123
As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Star Athletica, the Copy-
right Act clearly anticipates that two-dimensional designs can be functional
when it refers to “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features” that are insepara-
ble from utilitarian aspects of the design.124  The first two objects in this list,
pictorial and graphic features, are, in fact, two-dimensional design tech-
niques.  The statutory scheme thus makes clear that two-dimensional works
and features, and not only three-dimensional works and features, can be utili-
tarian.125  By stating that “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work[s]” can be
“useful article[s],” rather than limiting the statutory text to “sculptural
works,”126 it is apparent that Congress recognized that both two- and three-
dimensional works can be utilitarian.  Similarly, by indicating that “pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features” might be inseparable from “utilitarian
aspects” of the design, rather than just referring to “sculptural features,”127
the copyright statute signifies that both two- and three-dimensional features
can be utilitarian.128
As a matter of both logic and experience, two-dimensional designs or
design features can be functional when they operate to influence the way
another object is perceived.  But this does not mean that all two-dimensional
designs are necessarily functional because they may happen to affect how
other objects around them appear.  Seen in this light, the Sixth Circuit’s con-
cern in its opinion in Star Athletica that recognizing this aspect of the utility of
garment designs would deny protection to a Mondrian painting—on the
basis that “Mondrian’s painting would be unprotectable because the painting
decorates the room in which it hangs”129—is misplaced.
First, unlike the design of a garment, a painting is a “pictorial, graphic,
[or] sculptural work,” but is not a “useful article” as discussed above,130
because it has no “intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray
the appearance of the article or to convey information.”131  A Mondrian
painting merely portrays its own appearance.  It was designed and is con-
123 Cf. Marchese, supra note 2, at 408 (applying another framework to make the case
that two-dimensional design features that affect the perception of the wearer only when
worn are not truly two-dimensional features).
124 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1009 (2017) (rejecting
“[t]his argument [a]s inconsistent with the text of § 101”).
125 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
126 17 U.S.C. § 101.
127 Id.
128 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1009.
129 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 490 (6th Cir. 2015).
130 See supra Section II.B.
131 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra Section II.B (discussing why paintings are almost never
useful articles as per the statutory language).
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sumed for its inherent value as a picture.  For that reason, its copyrightability
would never turn on statutory separability analysis.132
Consider, by contrast, trompe l’oeil design techniques, which can be used
to make a room look bigger.133  As depicted in Figure 5, the components of a
design that trick the eye into thinking that the ceilings are higher might
mean that this sort of painting is the rare one that is a useful article.  That is,
such a painting should arguably not be treated like the Mondrian painting
because it has “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray
the appearance of the [painting] or to convey information.”134  Aspects of
the design that produce an altered visual effect, such as the use of foreshort-
ening and a vanishing point, are properly treated as utilitarian.135  As the
132 See Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 F. App’x 705, 715 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A
previous] court rightly recognized that inspiring imagination should not make an object
‘useful.’  Paintings and other pieces of pure art (to which Congress clearly extended copy-
right) have similar imagination-stoking ‘uses’ that would bring them within the ‘useful
article’ exception if ‘use’ were defined so broadly.  That approach ‘would have the “useful
article” exception swallow the general rule.’” (quoting Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp.,
703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983))); Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973 (observing that a painting
“has no intrinsic utilitarian function”); Flag Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann’s Country Flags &
Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1165, 1184 n.7 (D. Mass. 1989) (rejecting the argument that “a
painting would be a useful article because it has various utilitarian elements, including a
frame, a means for attaching the canvas to the frame, and a wire by which to hang it on a
wall”).  Even if the painting were subjected to a separability analysis, however, for the same
reason, the painting would be separable from any utilitarian aspects.  Recall that the sepa-
rability analysis would require the court to categorize components of the painting’s design
as purely expressive, purely functional, or dual-nature.  Because virtually all of the features
of the design operate solely to portray the painting’s appearance, they should be treated as
purely expressive and, thus, copyrightable if original.  Merely because the painting may
happen to have “really tied [a] room together,” THE BIG LEBOWSKI (Gramercy Pictures
1998), that does not magically make aspects of the painting (or the entire painting) utilita-
rian.  The painting might look good in a room, but the object of the painting is merely to
portray its own appearance.  What painters create and what consumers value in a painting
typically revolves around the intrinsic visual merits of the painting as such.  These aspects
of the painting portray their own appearance and are not utilitarian as a matter of the
Copyright Act.
133 See generally SYBILLE EBERT-SCHIFFERER ET AL., DECEPTIONS AND ILLUSIONS: FIVE CEN-
TURIES OF TROMPE L’OEIL PAINTING (2002).
134 17 U.S.C. § 101.
135 Cf. Marchese, supra note 2, at 407 (analogizing trompe l’oeil design techniques to
fashion design aspects that affect the perception of the wearer).  We think that the depen-
dent visual effect of influencing the perception of the wearer’s body and a situation in
which a designer included a picture of Spock from Star Trek on a t-shirt in order to make
viewers think that the shirt’s wearer is smart and rational are distinct scenarios for our
purposes.  First, note that affecting the perception of the wearer’s body is a direct and first-
order effect, while affecting viewers’ cognitions or judgments is an indirect and second-
order effect. Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“A treatise on . . . the mode of
drawing lines to produce the effect of perspective . . . would be the subject of copyright;
but no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right
to the art or manufacture described therein.”).  In addition, copyright law’s prohibition on
protection for inseparable functional features of useful articles is intended to channel fea-
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Supreme Court long ago recognized in Baker v. Selden,136 “[a] treatise on . . .
the mode of drawing lines to produce the effect of perspective . . . would be
the subject of copyright; but no one would contend that the copyright of the
treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described
therein.”137  Copyright law cannot be used to grant exclusive rights to partic-
ular techniques of design when those techniques have more than purely
depictive ends.
Figure 5: Andrea Pozzo, Fresco with Trompe L’Oeil Dome Painted on Low
Vaulting, Jesuit Church, Vienna, Austria (1703)
tures potentially covered by patent law there, where they will be suitably screened for pro-
tectability. See supra Section II.A (discussing the separate spheres of patent and copyright
laws).  A t-shirt with a design that causes its wearer to appear smarter or more rational is
not at all the sort of useful item that patent law protects. See supra Section II.A.  Therefore,
copyright law’s own definition of functionality—“an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information,” 17 U.S.C.
§ 101—would not filter from protectability such a t-shirt design.  Finally, the competitive
costs to other designers are substantially different in the two situations, because of the
number of available options for achieving one or the other.  Techniques for affecting the
perception of the wearer’s body are severely limited by the physical nature of bodies and
the physical features of human vision.  But there are so many more ways to achieve the
same mental effect.  One might, instead of wearing a shirt that depicted Spock, for exam-
ple, wear a shirt that said Oxford or Cambridge.
136 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
137 Id. at 102.
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2. How to Determine Functionality: Experts and Consumers
Returning to two-dimensional features of garment design, the Copyright
Act treats these aspects of garment design that influence the perception of a
wearer’s body as utilitarian aspects of a useful article, even if they are also
expressive features.  Figuring out, in any given case, whether a particular fea-
ture has this effect may depend on whom you ask.  Whether a design feature
is expressive, functional, or both can sometimes turn on which audience is
surveyed—be it garment designers, consumers of particular garment designs,
or fashion critics.138  But this sort of challenge is a standard feature of copy-
right jurisprudence, and it does not necessarily prevent the rational applica-
tion of the law or hinder Congress’s goals.139
One of us has previously written about audience choices in assessing
infringement.140  As discussed there, who decides whether a defendant’s
product is too similar to a plaintiff’s can affect the answer.141  We propose
that in intellectual property infringement cases, both experts and consumers
are the right audiences to be evaluating that similarity.142  That is, to
infringe, both experts and consumers must regard a defendant’s work as too
similar to the plaintiff’s.  The reason is intimately tied to why protection is
offered in the first instance.  Copyright law exists to encourage the creation
of works that are artistic contributions and to protect them from being cop-
ied in ways that harm the market for them.143  Therefore, it is imperative to
ensure that a defendant’s work appears similar enough to consumers that
they would substitute the defendant’s for the plaintiff’s, thereby cutting into
the plaintiff’s incentive to create, and that the work also appears too similar
to experts in the field to ensure that the defendant’s work has not made a
sufficient artistic contribution beyond the plaintiff’s.144
For similar reasons, the useful articles doctrine should incorporate both
of these two audiences as the relevant ones for determining the treatment of
design features: A design feature should be considered solely expressive (and
nonfunctional) only if both experts and consumers see it as a nonfunctional
feature.  Both groups are key to assessing the nonfunctionality of design fea-
tures, for much the same reasons that they are both key in assessing infringe-
ment.  For instance, a garment designer might claim to have had no intent to
produce a dress with a pattern that is slimming, but consumers buy the dress
138 See HORN & GUREL, supra note 12, at 311 (“[D]esigners impart their individual
imprints to the products of their craft and in doing so reveal a part of their nature, their
ideals, values, thoughts, and emotions.  The product in turn evokes a similar or perhaps a
widely different range of feelings and emotions in the observer.”).
139 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2014).  Similar issues arise with respect to questions
of originality, infringement, and fair use, for example. Id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 1251–52.
143 See id. at 1267–68.
144 See id. at 1268.
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for precisely that reason.  In such a case, the consumers’ treatment of the
garment should control.  Allowing designers to dictate the treatment of their
works by authorial fiat would allow them too much latitude to claim that their
designs are nonfunctional even though they clearly are and are purchased
for that reason.  Conversely, however, consumers may not sufficiently under-
stand the nature of design such that they do not realize that or how certain
features are, in fact, functional.  For example, a consumer may try on a dress
and think that its design looks beautiful without understanding design fea-
tures that were incorporated to make the dress look good on wearers’ bodies.
In such a case, design experts can testify that certain design features have
known effects, and courts can inquire into the designer’s creative process to
determine whether features were added in such a way as to influence the
appearance of the wearer.145  Thus, credible evidence that the designer
intended for the features to be functional would render them as such even if
consumers did not understand or appreciate their functionality.
3. Fashion’s Function in the Courts
That features affecting the perception of the wearer are functional is, we
think, the point that courts in the Second Circuit have made, perhaps less
clearly than desirable, in a line of cases identifying a utilitarian “decorative
function” in garment design.  For example, in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Cos-
tume Co.,146 a case concerning the copyrightability of various costume
designs, the Second Circuit explained that while conceptually separable fea-
tures of garment designs could, in theory, receive copyright protection, most
aspects of garment design would not meet this standard because “the very
decorative elements that stand out [are] intrinsic to the decorative function
of the clothing.”147  That is, the particular features of the garment for which
the designer claims protection are likely also to be ones that affect how the
wearer is perceived.
Similarly, in Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, Inc.,148 the Southern
District of New York explained that the sequins and crystals on the bodice of
the prom dress at issue, the horizontally ruched-satin fabric on the waistband,
and the layers of tulle in the skirt were “plainly fashioned to fit the specific
needs of a prom dress.”149  These aspects of the prom dress, while attractive
on their own, also contributed to the dress’s “utilitarian function of enhanc-
ing the wearer’s attractiveness.”150  The Second Circuit, upholding the judg-
ment, agreed, emphasizing that these garment features are not separable
145 Cf., e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding that “where design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s
artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences, conceptual separability
exists”).
146 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
147 Id. at 455.
148 808 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
149 Id. at 550.
150 Id.
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“pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features”151 because “the [physical or con-
ceptual] removal of these items would certainly adversely affect the garment’s
ability to function as a prom dress, a garment specifically meant to cover the
body in an attractive way for a special occasion.”152
These opinions correctly recognize that garments do not typically exist
merely to look attractive in their own right but also to make those who wear
them look more attractive.  This “decorative function” is one we think is bet-
ter referred to as having “dependent value,” by which we mean value depen-
dent on use in relation to another object, or more specifically in the context
of fashion, features that affect the perception of the wearer.153  Moreover,
these opinions treat aspects of garment design that affect how the wearer
looks as appropriately placed on the “utilitarian aspects” side of the expres-
sive/functional ledger when determining conceptual separability, even if
they may also fall on the other side as “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural fea-
tures.”154  Indeed, many features of garment design will have this dual
nature.  They will be both expressive features and simultaneously utilitarian
aspects of the garment.  This is consistent with the definition of “useful arti-
cles” in § 101, which recognizes that design features may perform both
expressive and functional roles.155
The opinions emerging from the Second Circuit courts differ substan-
tially from the recent Sixth Circuit opinion in Star Athletica.156  Analyzing the
cheerleading uniforms at issue, the court attempted to categorize the compo-
nents of the uniform designs as expressive “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features” or functional utilitarian aspects.157  In so doing, however, the court
made no allowance for the possibility that a component could be dual-
nature—that it could play both expressive and functional roles in the design.
And the court explicitly declined to adopt the Second Circuit’s account of
the “decorative function” of fashion, because it feared that doing so would
commit it to holding an artistic painting uncopyrightable.158  According to
151 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
152 Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 F. App’x 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2012); cf. Kiesel-
stein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that
the belt buckles at issue “include decorative features that serve an aesthetic as well as a
utilitarian purpose”); Elastic Wonder, Inc. v. Posey, 179 F. Supp. 3d 307, 317 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (“It is the functional purpose of covering the body in an attractive and comfortable
way that motivates the designs of fittings of certain shapes, and the utilitarian function of
the leggings as clothing is primary over the ornamental aspect.”).
153 Giovanna Marchese criticizes the Jovani decision and its “decorative function” termi-
nology for “denying protection to an aesthetic work that has a concomitant utilitarian func-
tion . . . rather than advancing a convincing legal argument.”  Marchese, supra note 2, at
402.
154 Cf. id. at 399–401 (suggesting a similar interpretation of Jovani as one of multiple
possibilities).
155 See supra Section II.A.
156 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015).
157 Id. at 490.
158 Id. (“Such a holding would render nearly all artwork unprotectable.  Under this
theory of functionality, Mondrian’s painting would be unprotectable because the painting
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the Sixth Circuit, the stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking on the
uniforms were purely expressive and separable from the uniforms’ functions
of covering the body, sweat wicking, and enabling athletic performance.159
We explain how our approach to fashion’s function would handle Star Athlet-
ica’s fashion design elements in Part III.
D. The Unprotectability of Dual-Nature Design Features in Copyright Law
Recall from above that the key feature of the useful articles doctrine
involves the separability of expressive features of a work from its functional
aspects.  If a work exhibits purely expressive features, those features may be
separable from the work’s function.  Dual-nature design features, however,
should not be protected by copyright law.  These features cannot be treated
as separable under any recognized test for separability, because the same
design aspects play both expressive and functional roles simultaneously.
When a claimed aspect of a design is both visually appealing and at the same
time utilitarian it makes no sense to say that the visually appealing nature of
the aspect “can be identified separately from, and [be] capable of existing
independently of” the functional nature of the aspect.160  The curve of the
hood of a Corvette Stingray both makes the car look beautiful and affects its
aerodynamics.161  In drafting the useful articles doctrine, Congress rejected
copyright protection for these sorts of dual-nature designs to prevent copy-
right law from being used as a form of backdoor patent protection.162
In the myriad of cases involving separability, we have not located any
court decision—neither by the Supreme Court nor by any other federal
court—that has expressly found an element of a useful article to possess this
dual nature and also to be separable and therefore copyrightable.  As the
Eleventh Circuit has explained, “functional components of useful articles, no
matter how artistically designed, have generally been denied copyright pro-
tection” as inseparable.163  Consider just a few examples: The Ninth Circuit
has held that the distinctive shape of a hookah water container is also func-
tional and therefore not separable.164  The Eleventh Circuit has found all
components of a light fixture to be uncopyrightable because “the expressive
decorates the room in which it hangs.  But paintings are copyrightable.” (citing Gay Toys,
Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983))).  For our criticism of this reason-
ing, see supra text accompanying notes 129–132.
159 Star Athletica, 799 F.3d at 492 (“We therefore conclude the arrangement of stripes,
chevrons, color blocks, and zigzags are ‘wholly unnecessary to the performance of’ the
garment’s ability to cover the body, permit free movement, and wick moisture.” (quoting
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985))).
160 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
161 See Steve Temple, 2014 Corvette C4 Stingray—Like a Knife, SUPER CHEVY (Oct. 2,
2013), http://www.superchevy.com/features/1309-2014-corvette-c7-stingray-like-a-knife.
162 See supra Part I.
163 Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 924 (11th Cir. 1983)
(listing physically separable elements, however, as an exception).
164 See Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2014).
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aspects of the light fixtures are also functional components of the utilitarian
articles.”165  The Second Circuit has held that “the form of [a bicycle] rack is
influenced in significant measure by utilitarian concerns and thus any aes-
thetic elements cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilita-
rian elements.”166  A Colorado district court has held that a lifelike model of
a human skeleton designed to teach anatomy is functional and that any
expressive features are not separable.167  If these dual-nature elements of
useful articles receive protection, it must be through the patent regime.168
One can appreciate the futility of a claim to copyrightability of dual-
nature design features when one tries to imagine the aspects of their designs
to which copyright might attach.  As the Copyright Act explains, copyright
protection for a useful article extends only “to the extent” of the separable
expressive features of the design.169  Thus, while the separable expressive fea-
tures may receive protection, copyright will never cover the utilitarian aspects
of the design.170  As a matter of logic, the Copyright Act cannot both protect
the expressive features of the uniforms and preserve from protection their
functional aspects when those expressive features and functional aspects are
one and the same.171
165 Progressive Lighting, Inc. v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 549 F. App’x 913, 921 (11th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
166 Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987).
167 See Zahourek Sys., Inc. v. Balanced Body Univ., LLC, No. 13-cv-01812, 2016 WL
1377165 (D. Colo. Apr. 7, 2016).
168 There are, by contrast, many cases in which courts hold that a feature of a useful
article is expressive, but not functional, and also separable (and therefore copyrightable).
See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 201 (1954) (holding an expressive dancer statuette to
be separable from a functional lamp); Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784
F.3d 1404, 1404–05 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a decorative layer featuring two-dimen-
sional artwork between a core board and a transparent overlay in laminate wood flooring
was expressive, separable, and copyrightable); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods.,
Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 914 (7th Cir. 2004) (determining that specific facial features on a man-
nequin used as a hair stand and makeup model were expressive, and not functional,
choices and were therefore separable and copyrightable); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories
by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the expressive, nonfunctional
ornamentation on belt buckles is conceptually separable from the functional aspects of the
belt buckle); DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he design
elements of the two Batmobiles at issue here are conceptually separable from their underly-
ing car.  In particular, the 1989 Batmobile’s entire frame, consisting of the rear exagger-
ated, sculpted bat-fin and the mandibular front, is an artistic feature that can stand on its
own without the underlying vehicle.  The underlying vehicle would still be a car without
the exaggerated bat features.”); Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d
75, 99 (D. Conn. 2012) (“If the [Lego] minifigures’ capacity to attach to other toys is
functional, while their capacity to inspire imagination or play are not, then the drawings
on the face and torso are clearly conceptually separable . . . .”).
169 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
170 These will always remain free to copy unless protected by another intellectual prop-
erty regime such as patent law. See Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6.
171 The Supreme Court does not say otherwise in Star Athletica, but merely assumes that
the design elements at issue are expressive and not functional. See infra Part III.  For an
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When the same aspects of the designs are simultaneously expressive and
functional, courts need not inquire further into their separability.  The
expressive and functional aspects are inherently inseparable, and thus the
designs are unprotectable as a matter of law.  As we demonstrate in the case
study of cheerleading uniforms below, the vast majority of components of
garment design should fall into the dual-nature category and should thus be
screened out of copyright protection by the useful articles doctrine, if not by
other copyrightability doctrines such as merger.  Two- and three-dimensional
aspects of a garment design that influence the perception of the wearer
should always fall into the dual-nature category.  Because the useful articles
doctrine should always screen out dual-nature design features as inherently
inseparable, they should never receive copyright protection.  This result is
consistent with Congress’s desire that copyright law is not the proper home
for garment design.172  Only if a garment exhibits purely expressive features
and only if those features are also separable from the rest of the garment
should the design of an article of clothing ever receive copyright.  This
should be a rare occurrence.173
III. THE CONCEPTUAL SHORTCOMINGS OF STAR ATHLETICA
The account presented in Part II best comports with the Copyright Act’s
useful articles doctrine as Congress drafted it and the policy goals under-
girding it.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to affirm
these principles in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.174  Instead, the
Court charted an entirely new path through copyright law, upsetting decades
of lower court precedents and altering the nature of copyright’s functionality
screening.  Here we attempt to explain what the Court did and how it went so
wrong.  We also discuss how our account of fashion’s function should still
matter for copyright validity and infringement even if its role in the useful
articles doctrine is now different.
elaboration on this point with a comparison to copyright law’s merger doctrine, see supra
note 85.
172 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668
(“Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set,
or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can
be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not
be copyrighted . . . .”).
173 Costumes are potentially copyrightable garment designs. See, e.g., Charles E. Col-
man, The History and Doctrine of American Copyright Protection for Fashion Design: Managing
Mazer, 7 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151, 190–202 (2016).  When a designer depicts a char-
acter or animal in a costume made to be worn by a person, there may be aspects of the
character or animal design that are unrelated to any functional consideration.  Design ele-
ments that are based on the need to conform the costume to the particular features of the
human body, however, are functional and not protectable. See Entm’t Research Grp., Inc.
v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1218–24 (9th Cir. 1997).
174 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
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The case centers on the copyrightability of the cheerleading uniform
designs shown in Figures 6 and 7.175  The Supreme Court held the arrange-
ment of stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking in the garment designs
to be separable features of useful articles and potentially copyrightable.176  In
light of our analysis above, we think the Supreme Court came to the wrong
conclusion, after failing to recognize that the arrangement of stripes,
chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking in the garment designs at issue—like
many components of clothing designs—has both expressive and utilitarian
aspects.
Figure 6: Varsity’s Claimed Designs
175 Id. at 1007.
176 Id.
Design 078 
Re£i\ tr.:llion No, VA 1-417-427 
Design 299B 
Registration No. VA 1-3 19-226 
0 
Design 08 15 
Reaistration No. VA 1-675-905 
Design 299A 
Registration No . VA 1-319-228 
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Figure 7: Varsity’s Claimed Design
Varsity submitted the above designs for registration by the Copyright
Office, and Varsity sued Star Athletica for producing uniforms displaying sim-
ilar designs.  The district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment
motion, ruling that the designs were not protectable because they served the
function of identifying their wearers as cheerleaders.177  The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed.178  It is worth spending a moment on the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion because, even though we think it reached the wrong con-
clusion, it did so via a logical methodology.  The appellate court engaged in
the correct set of steps, first determining that the uniform designs were use-
ful articles and then identifying their expressive and functional features.179
It was only in applyig this step that we think the court erred.  It concluded
that the only features of the uniforms that were functional were those that
contributed to their mechanical use as garments, such as enabling wearers to
jump and flip or cover their bodies.180  The Sixth Circuit determined that
the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking were purely expressive features and
were separable from the rest of the uniforms.181  In doing so, the court
177 Id. at 1008; Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL
819422, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), rev’d, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015).
178 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2015).
179 See id. at 487–88.
180 See id. at 490.
181 See id. at 491–93.
D esig n 074 
R egi stration No . VA 1-4 11 -535 
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rejected arguments based on the Second Circuit cases discussed above about
the designs’ decorative function.182
The Sixth Circuit understood the basics of the useful articles doctrine
and its separability analysis.  Its only problem was its failure to grasp that the
plaintiff’s designs are not purely expressive.  Instead, the stripes, chevrons,
zigzags, and color-blocking in the claimed designs serve a dual-nature pur-
pose, similar to those documented in Part I.  They are simultaneously both
expressive and functional, serving to accentuate and elongate the cheer-
leader’s body and make it appear curvier in particular areas.183  We detail
some of these dual-nature features in light of the discussion in Part I.
In Design 078, the white patches in the color-blocked pattern help cre-
ate the visual effect of curviness by creating an hourglass shape with contrast,
as in Stella McCartney’s dresses.184  The V-shaped neckline together with the
inverted-V-shaped slit on the skirt elongates the body by exploiting the
Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion.  The V-shaped neckline also serves to point to the bust
and elongate the neck.  The color-blocking, using contrasting colors, creates
contrast and draws attention to the wearer’s body.  The repeating stripe pat-
tern at the neckline, bust, waist, and skirt hem draws viewers’ attention from
the top of the wearer’s neckline all the way to the bottom of the wearer’s skirt
to see that part of the wearer’s body as unified.185
Again, in Design 0815, Varsity employs color-blocking; this time a darker
blue color along the side of the uniform to make the wearer look both more
slender in certain places and curvier in others, just as in the Stella McCartney
dresses.186  In addition, the V-shaped striping on the front center of the uni-
form serves to further accentuate the bust.  The V-shaped neckline both
points to the bust and elongates the neck.  Designs 299A and 299B have some
of the same features associated with the previous two designs, plus there is a
diagonal striping, which calls attention to the body’s rounded contours.
Additionally, the chevron at the bottom of the uniform top is cut to display
some of the belly and draw attention to it.  Design 074 serves to accentuate
the curves and elongate the body for many of the reasons discussed with
regard to the previous designs.  In addition, the color-blocking serves to high-
light the bust by coloring it in white in contrast to the green above it and navy
blue below it.
182 See id. at 490.
183 For a similar observation about these cheerleading uniform designs, see Marchese,
supra note 2, at 412; see also id. at 379 (stating that the designs “create a trim silhouette
shape of the cheerleader”).
184 Giovanna Marchese likewise emphasizes that “the chevrons and stripes are arranged
so that the edge of the chevron’s ‘V’ frames the cheerleader’s chest,” and that “[t]he
panels immediately outside the ‘V’ use colors that sharply contrast the color within the ‘V,’
which creates a visual effect in the viewer of an hourglass body shape.” Id. at 379 n.15.
185 See DELONG, supra note 9, at 229 (“Direction can be aided by repetition of similar
parts, often called rhythm.  Rhythm is defined as the ordered recurrence of parts that leads
the eye.”).
186 See supra note 21–23 and accompanying text.
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The stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking that form the heart of
Varsity’s uniform designs do not merely portray their own appearance or
convey information.  They also influence the appearance of the uniform’s
wearer.  These features are the reason that the designs work as appropriate
designs for garments meant to emphasize the fitness, athleticism, and attrac-
tiveness of those who don them.  It is no accident that Varsity here chose to
design its uniforms in this fashion, and it is no accident that many cheerlead-
ing uniforms share similar design features.187  Granting copyright protection
to these designs would enable Varsity to monopolize functional aspects of
garments without satisfying the exacting demands of patent law.  Although
other designers might be free to produce cheerleading uniforms incorporat-
ing features that flatten the bust, widen the waist, and shorten the legs, we
suspect that they are unlikely to find a vibrant market for such products.
This is not the sort of competitive advantage that copyright law is intended to
foster.188
The claimed features of Varsity’s cheerleading uniform designs are per-
fect examples of dual-nature features.  As explained in Part I, the arrange-
ment of stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking that make up the
expressive features of Varsity’s designs also serve a functional purpose: to
influence how the wearer’s body is perceived.  The particular design features
of Varsity’s uniforms do not exist merely to portray their own appearance.
They are not merely ornamental or arbitrarily determined in the way that a
graphic of a cartoon character printed on a shirt is.  They are placed where
they are because of the nature of the human bodies that will wear them.  The
shapes, sizes, and colors of the design features look the way they do because
these particular shapes, sizes, and colors will interact with wearers’ bodies in
particular ways.  While they might be aesthetically pleasing or attractive in
their own right, they also affect the actual perception of the wearers’ bodies
as aesthetically pleasing or attractive.189
187 It is also no accident that Varsity’s designs for male cheerleaders often have differ-
ent design elements from those for female cheerleaders, because the physical aspects of
male and female bodies that are emphasized differ. See 2016 VARSITY SPIRIT FASHION CATA-
LOG 82, www.varsity.com/publications/Varsity-Spirit-Fashion-2016.html#82.
188 See Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Sony understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play games Sony
produces or licenses.  The copyright law, however, does not confer such a monopoly.”);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523–24 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n attempt
to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to
the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression.”).
189 This is a different claim from the one made by Judge McKeague in his dissenting
opinion in the Sixth Circuit’s decision below in Star Athletica. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v.
Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 494–95 (6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting).  We
are not claiming that the design features perform a signifying function to identify the wear-
ers as cheerleaders, a “function” we think is properly conceived as “convey[ing] informa-
tion,” and thus not utilitarian according to the Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  If
any feature of a design that served to identify something or someone were to be treated as
functional by copyright law, then no trademark could ever be copyrighted, because the
point of a trademark is to identify the source of the goods to which it is affixed.  Clearly,
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Unlike the Sixth Circuit, which misinterpreted what makes a design fea-
ture utilitarian or expressive, the Supreme Court thoroughly misunderstood
the statute it claimed to be interpreting.  Justice Thomas’s majority opinion
treats the separability criteria as both intellectually simple and doctrinally
weak when they are, in fact, neither of these things.  He first asks whether the
decisionmaker can “spot some two- or three-dimensional element that
appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities.”190  He describes
this requirement as “not onerous,”191 as his application of the test to the
uniforms proves.  According to the majority, an element of a design counts as
an expressive feature if it looks like something.192  As we discuss elsewhere in
a commentary on the decision, “[c]onsidering that this is the area of copy-
right law that applies to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, it is impossi-
ble that the claimed works would not have some such features.”193
The Supreme Court next asks whether the identified expressive feature
can exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.194  The Court
explains that “the feature must be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work . . . once it is imagined apart from the useful article.”195
Finally, the Court indicates, “If the feature is not capable of existing as a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once separated from the useful article,
then it was not a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of that article, but
rather one of its utilitarian aspects.”196  Although we do not find these state-
ments to be entirely clear, we think that they imply that given “some [expres-
sive] qualities that were spotted in the first step, the second step of the
analysis asks whether they could be fixed in some form other than the useful
article itself.”197  Or as we put it more simply elsewhere: “In effect, the major-
ity’s test for separability amounts to: Could you draw it on a sheet of
paper?198”  “Here, because the [uniform designs] could have been, and actu-
this is not the case. See Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election
of Rights Versus Selection of Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 242 (2013).  We argue that
these design features are functional instead because they were designed to influence how
the wearers’ bodies were perceived.
190 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 1012 (“[O]ne can identify the decorations as features having pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural qualities.”).
193 Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Essay, Forgetting Functionality, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 121 (2017).
194 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 193, at 122–24.
198 Id. at 122.  More generously, the Court may be asking if you could draw it on a sheet
of paper and it would look not entirely like the useful article as such, whatever that would
be.  For example, if you drew the expressive features of a shovel on a piece of paper, it
would simply look identical to the shovel.
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ally were, reproduced on other (presumably non-useful) media[—in draw-
ings—]they were separable.”199
The Supreme Court has utterly failed to understand the statute and its
requirement that decisionmakers identify distinct expressive and functional
features of the claimed work.  In its interpretation of the “ordinary, contem-
porary, common meaning”200 of the statute, the Court asks whether the spot-
ted expressive features can be “imagined apart from the useful article.”201
But this is not how the statute reads.202  Instead, the statute asks whether the
work’s expressive features can be separated from “the utilitarian aspects of
the article.”203  The difference is not trivial.  The Court’s statutory misread-
ing substantially lowered the bar for claimants: Rather than distinguishing
between and separating the uniform design’s pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural features from its utilitarian aspects, the Court only asked whether the
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural features were distinct and separate from the
uniform itself.  Varsity could then claim the stripes, chevrons, and color-
blocking because, once they were imaginatively removed from the uniform, a
uniform could still exist.  That is a different exercise from asking whether a
design’s pictorial, graphic, and sculptural features could be separated from
the design’s utilitarian aspects.204
Under the correct formulation of the test, the Court would have had to
determine which components of the design it should treat as utilitarian
aspects, something it never asked under the test it conceived for itself.
To make matters worse, the Court failed to appreciate how rigorously
Congress intended copyright law to treat functionality.  The Court seems to
have rejected the notion that copyright law should only be used to protect a
work’s exclusively expressive features.205  The majority explains that the
imaginatively removed feature of the work “may not be a useful article,” but
the majority concludes that the feature is still protectable even if “the
imagined remainder [is not] a fully functioning useful article at all, much
less an equally useful one.”206  This reading of the Act flips the statute on its
head.  Instead of copyright law protecting only solely expressive features of a
work and excluding completely functional and dual-nature aspects, the
Court’s opinion will prevent copyright from attaching only to purely func-
tional features of the work.207
199 Id; see Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012.  In Star Athletica, the Supreme Court officially
“abandon[ed] the distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual’ separability.” Id. at
1014.
200 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010 (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519
U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
201 Id.
202 See Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 193, at 122–24.
203 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
204 Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 193, at 122–24.
205 See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013.
206 Id. at 1013–14.
207 See Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6.
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Given the Court’s statutory interpretation, it never had to think carefully
about the arguments we have raised above.  Because the Court lowered the
bar for copyright claimants to protect functional aspects of their designs, it
did not significantly interrogate whether the features of the uniform designs
that influenced perceptions of wearers’ bodies were dual-nature.208  The
Court further neglected to rely on the part of the copyright statute that
explains what makes a feature utilitarian209 and which we think requires the
classification of many fashion features as utilitarian and therefore inseparable
and unprotectable.
Although this is a shame, it is not a complete catastrophe.  The useful
articles doctrine is not the only mechanism by which copyright law polices
functionality, and we are sanguine that subsequent courts will utilize these
tools.
For example, for the same reasons as we have articulated as to why these
design features are not separable, they likely run afoul of the merger doc-
trine and ought to be denied protectability on that ground as well.  Recall
that when there are a limited number of ways to express something, the
merger doctrine denies copyrightability to that expression, lest it protect the
function too.210  Given the particularities of human vision and human torsos,
we suspect that there are only a limited number of ways to express the func-
tions of accentuating the cheerleader’s curves, lengthening the cheerleader’s
torso, and so forth.  There is thus good basis to deny copyrightability to these
features for having merged function and expression.
In addition, when decisionmakers compare a plaintiff’s work with an
allegedly infringing work, copyright law demands that they filter out from
their analysis aspects of the plaintiff’s work that are functional.211  For exam-
ple, when courts have dealt with other highly functional works like computer
software, they have excluded from the infringement comparison those
aspects of the plaintiffs’ works that improved a program’s efficiency.212
Accordingly, when decisionmakers are asked to compare garments like Var-
sity’s to allegedly infringing copies like Star Athletica’s, they should be
instructed to ignore aspects of the plaintiff’s work that contribute to its func-
tion, including dual-nature features like the ones discussed above.  Doing so
will help achieve Congress’s goal of limiting copyright protection to func-
208 The Court refers to this argument but does not address it, because it does not deem
partial functionality to bar protection. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013; see also Buccafusco
& Fromer, supra note 193, at 123.
209 See supra Sections II.B, II.C; see also Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 193, at 123.
210 See supra Section II.A.
211 See Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6.
212 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of
Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming
2017); Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the
Tests of Software Copyright Infringement (UC Berkeley Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2667740,
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2667740.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 43 15-NOV-17 13:45
2017] fashion’s  function 93
tional designs and will minimize costs to consumers and subsequent
designers.
IV. FASHION’S FUNCTION IN TRADEMARK LAW
Copyright law is not the only field of intellectual property law that is
concerned with screening out functional aspects of product design.  Both
trademark law and design patent law also cast a wary eye toward functionality.
Although the doctrines these regimes use to screen functionality differ from
those employed by copyright law, their concerns are similar.213  Accordingly,
we analyze how these two fields should respond to the particular issue of
fashion design’s dependent functionality, considering trademark law in this
Part and design patent law in Part V.
Unlike copyright law, trademark law is not concerned with encouraging
the creation of new aesthetic works.214  Instead, to promote fair competition
and protect consumers, trademark law guards consumers from marketplace
confusion by ensuring that certain symbols accurately reflect the source of
goods.215  If a pair of shoes has the distinctive Nike swoosh on it, consumers
should be able to trust that the shoes are made by Nike.  Trademark law
covers more than just words or images that designate source, however.  It can
also be used to protect features of a product’s design or packaging that iden-
tify its source.216  This is known as trade dress.  Accordingly, the distinctive
shape of a candy bar may indicate to consumers that it is made by Mars, Inc.
Trademark law is similar to copyright in at least one important respect: it
also needs to be concerned about functionality.217  Just as features of a picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural work can have utilitarian features, so too can a
product’s design or packaging.  Moreover, allowing mark owners to protect
the functional aspects of their designs can have anticompetitive effects as it
does in copyright law.218  Like copyrights, trademarks do not undergo the
substantial ex ante evaluation that patents do to ensure that they are new and
nonobvious.  Like copyrights, trademarks can, but need not, be registered to
213 Cf. Sarah Burstein, Faux Amis in Design Law, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 1455, 1455 (2015)
(“There are . . . faux amis in U.S. design law—words that appear the same in the key legal
regimes (design patent, trademark, and copyright) but which can have problematically
different meanings.  Consider, for example, the words ‘functional’ and ‘ornamental.’
These terms are used in all three regimes to describe limits on protectable subject matter.
But they have different meanings in each.” (footnote omitted)).
214 But cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1885 (2011) (arguing that trademark law encourages mark creators to devise ever
more creative marks in some respects).
215 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1
(4th ed. 2016); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007).
216 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
217 See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823 (2011).
218 Robert G. Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183 (2015);
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6; McKenna, supra note 217.
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be protected.219  (However, among other requirements, trademarks cannot
be confusingly similar to existing marks,220 ensuring that they must be “new”
to some, but only to some, extent.)  And even worse than copyrights, trade-
marks can last forever, so long as they remain in use in commerce.221
Accordingly, trademark law also applies a set of functionality screens to pre-
vent claimants from using it as a means of obtaining backdoor patents.222
The rules of trademark law’s functionality doctrines are complex, and
there is little judicial or scholarly agreement about their precise contours.223
Without descending into a full analysis, we nonetheless show that our
account of fashion’s function also matters significantly to trademark law.  In
many cases, allowing trademark protection for aspects of garment design that
affect the perception of the wearer’s body will produce problematic anticom-
petitive effects.
A. Trademark’s Functionality Doctrine(s)
To ensure that trademark law is not used to provide claimants with an
undue competitive advantage, the law excludes functional trademarks and
trade dress from protection.224  Trademark law enables owners to take advan-
tage of the value of their reputations for producing high-quality products,
but it seeks to prevent them from using trademarks to gain advantages unre-
lated to their reputation.225  This unfair advantage could result if the mark
extended to cover useful product features that competitors were then pre-
vented from producing.226  It could also occur if the mark extended to prod-
uct features that consumers desired to purchase irrespective of their source-
signifying characteristics.227  Trademark doctrine refers to the former of
these concerns as “utilitarian functionality”228 and the latter, somewhat con-
fusingly, as “aesthetic functionality.”229
219 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1114 (2012).
220 Id. § 1052(d).
221 Id. § 1051.
222 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 640
(6th Cir. 2002) (“Protection of functional product features is the province of [not trade-
mark law, but] patent law, which confers a monopoly over new product designs for a lim-
ited time only, after which competitors are free to copy at will.”).
223 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 215, § 7:81 (“The notion of ‘aesthetic functionality’ is an
unwarranted expansion of the utilitarian functionality policy, carrying it far outside the
patent-related rationale that justifies the policy.”); McKenna, supra note 217, at 824
(“[D]espite its potential power, the functionality doctrine is quite inconsistently applied.”).
224 Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6 (manuscript at 68).
225 McKenna, supra note 217, at 825.
226 In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (“[I]t is
clear that courts in the past have considered the public policy involved in this area of the
law as, not the right to slavishly copy articles . . . but the need to copy those articles . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)).
227 Hughes, supra note 35, at 1240.
228 Id. at 1238.
229 Id. at 1240.
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The Supreme Court case of TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc.230 nicely illustrates the utilitarian functionality doctrine.  In TrafFix, the
plaintiff claimed trade dress protection for the dual-spring design of its wind-
resistant road signs.  The spring design had been claimed in an expired util-
ity patent, and the plaintiff attempted to prevent others from using it as trade
dress.  According to the Court, “ ‘[i]n general terms, a product feature is
functional,’ and cannot serve as a trademark, ‘if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.’”231
Here, the patent on the dual-spring design constituted strong evidence of
such functionality.232  Additionally, the dual-spring design offered “a unique
and useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind.”233  The design “is the
reason the device works,”234 and thus it was barred from trademark protec-
tion to allow others adequate opportunity to compete.
Importantly, the TrafFix opinion distinguished the dual-spring design
from “an arbitrary flourish” in the product’s configuration.235  The Court
explained, “[i]n a case where a manufacturer seeks to protect arbitrary, inci-
dental, or ornamental aspects of features of a product found in the patent
claims, such as arbitrary curves in the legs or an ornamental pattern painted
on the springs, a different result might obtain.”236  Such features would have
no effect on the product’s function, and thus, allowing trademark protection
over them would pose little risk to competition.  Presumably, merely orna-
mental aspects of trade dress would not affect the cost or quality of the
article.237
There might, however, be situations in which decorative or ornamental
features of trade dress do unduly impinge upon healthy competition.  For
example, purchasers of farm equipment may desire that their equipment all
be painted a particular shade of green.  This may be because they think
green is the most appropriate color for farm equipment or because they want
all of their equipment to match, regardless of its source.  In such a case,
giving one party sole access to the shade of green would put other parties at a
competitive disadvantage.238  Accordingly, courts have developed the doc-
trine of “aesthetic functionality” to prevent trade dress from imposing these
costs.
Making out a case for aesthetic functionality is harder than it is for utili-
tarian functionality.  As explained above, the latter can be proven by showing
that the design feature affects the cost or quality of the article.  Aesthetic
230 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
231 Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514
U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
232 Id. at 29–30.
233 Id. at 33.
234 Id. at 34.
235 Id.
236 Id. (emphasis added).
237 Id. at 33.
238 See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff’d, 721
F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
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functionality requires a more robust proof: to count as aesthetically func-
tional, the design features must create a significant non-reputation-related
advantage.239  Typically, this means that the product features amount to a
competitive necessity and that other options are not nearly as good.240  Thus,
if a particular color is important to distinguish different kinds or dosages of
medication, courts should reject the use of that color as protectable trade
dress.241
B. The Functionality of Trademarked Designs That Look Good On
Whatever the doctrinal coherence of these two aspects of trade dress
functionality law, it is clear that courts will inquire into the extent to which
allowing protection will unduly restrict market competition.242  The safest
trademarks and trade dress, then, will be those that are merely ornamental or
are arbitrarily related to the product.243  From our analysis of garment design
techniques in Part II, it should be clear that many aspects of clothing design
will have some degree of trade dress functionality.  In addition to the kinds of
technical or mechanical functionality that trademark law already excludes, it
should also recognize the ways in which trade dress can function to look
good on.  Copyright law treats features of garments that do not merely por-
tray their own appearance as functional, as trademark law should with fea-
tures that are not arbitrary and merely ornamental.
Features of clothing design that influence the way the wearer’s body is
perceived, such that they make him or her look thinner, bigger, taller, or
curvier should be treated as bearing on the functionality inquiry in trade
dress law.  Such features should be treated as functional to the extent that
they confer an unfair competitive advantage.  A case from outside the gar-
ment design industry helpfully illustrates this point.  In Brunswick Corp. v.
British Seagull Ltd.,244 Brunswick attempted to register use of the color black
on outboard boat motors.245  The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board’s refusal to register the trade dress on the ground
239 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
240 Id.
241 Id. at 170 (“The upshot is that, where a color serves a significant nontrademark
function—whether to distinguish a heart pill from a digestive medicine or to satisfy the
‘noble instinct for giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary
things,’ courts will examine whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a
group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition through actual or
potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient.” (citation omitted) (quoting
G.K. CHESTERTON, SIMPLICITY AND TOLSTOY 61 (1912))).
242 See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (“Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition
that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products.  In
general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an
item, it will be subject to copying.”).
243 Id. at 35.
244 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
245 Id. at 1529.
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that it was functional.246  Here, functionality was grounded in part on the
perception that “objects colored black appear smaller than they do when
they are painted other lighter or brighter colors,” and that purchasers often
desire motors to look smaller.247  Because black changed people’s percep-
tions of the motor’s size and because this made black-colored motors more
valuable in the market, granting exclusive rights to the color to a single firm
would distort competition.  Whether this sort of functionality is better
labeled “utilitarian” or “aesthetic” is less important than the recognition that
aspects of design can have these functional effects.248
We can readily imagine other scenarios in which a claimant’s trade dress
inappropriately influences the perception of objects.  As with the motor, cer-
tain colors may influence how we perceive objects.249  High-visibility colors
can be functional in the right context, and so too are other colors that affect
people’s perception of the size or shape of objects and bodies.  Moreover, as
mentioned above, incorporating certain two-dimensional patterns and
shapes can also change how the wearer’s body is perceived.250  Vertical
stripes down the side of athletic pants—like the ones Adidas uses as a mark
on its clothing251—may make the wearer’s legs look longer and leaner.
Although the stripes might be source-signifying, they will also produce non-
reputation-related advantages if people look sportier wearing them.252
In addition, three-dimensional aspects of garment design can also prove
functional, just as they can in copyright law.  Although savvy consumers may
associate a particular dress design with, say, Stella McCartney, such as those
shown on actress Kate Winslet in Figure 1, to the extent that it incorporates
features that are not merely ornamental or arbitrary but instead influence
how the wearer is perceived, the garment should not receive protection.253
246 Id.
247 British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 1199 (T.T.A.B. 1993),
overruled on other grounds by Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
248 Justin Hughes suggests that cases like these are better understood as “cognitive” or
“perceptual” functionality because they involve taking advantage of humans’ mental sys-
tems and preferences for certain shapes and features.  Hughes, supra note 35, at 1252–53.
249 See id. (listing sources discussing color and perception).
250 See supra Part II.
251 See Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., No. CV-01-1582, 2002 WL 31971831, at
*7–8 (D. Or. July 31, 2002).
252 This is different from other appliques that simply provide visual interest on a gar-
ment. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (involving
trade dress of this sort).
253 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 624
(6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he clothing designs A & F seeks a monopoly on are functional as a
matter of law, and therefore not protectable as trade dress.”).  In fact, the Sixth Circuit’s
approach to the functionality of clothing design in trademark law is even broader than the
one we propose.  The court seems to suggest that the combination of clothing elements to
produce a certain image or aura is functional. See id. at 643.  The court writes:
Use of these elements in combination with one another and with Abercrombie’s
trademarks on clothing bearing “primary color combinations . . . in connection
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The dresses depicted in Figure 3 clearly illustrate how to create a curvier,
leaner look for the wearer.254  By contrast, Bjo¨rk’s famous swan dress, shown
in Figure 8, may be sufficiently arbitrary that it could be a candidate for
protection.255
Figure 8: Bjo¨rk’s Swan Dress by Marjan Pejoski 256
We do not take a position on whether any given design does or should
meet the legal standard for exclusion in trade dress law.  As explained above,
trademark law has been somewhat more forgiving of certain kinds of func-
with solid, plaid and stripe designs” and made from “all natural cotton, wool and
twill fabrics” creates reliable rugged and/or athletic casual clothing drawn from a
consistent texture, design, and color palette.  Were the law to grant Abercrombie
protection of these features, the paucity of comparable alternative features that
competitors could use to compete in the market for casual clothing would leave
competitors at a significant non-reputational competitive disadvantage and
would, therefore, prevent effective competition in the market.
Id.; see also Ann Bartow, Counterfeits, Copying and Class, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 707, 725 (2011).
254 See supra Section II.C.
255 See Timothy Mitchell, Bjo¨rk’s Once-Ridiculed Swan Dress Now Honored at MoMA, N.Y.
POST (Mar. 15, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/03/15/bjorks-once-ridiculed-swan-dress-
now-displayed-at-moma.
256 Biggest Oscar Gaffes Ever!, US WEEKLY (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.usmagazine.com/
celebrity-news/pictures/biggest-oscar-gaffes-ever-2012242/21073.
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tionality than copyright law is.257  Setting the precise scope for trademark’s
functionality doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.258  Nonetheless, it
should be clear that the relationship between functionality and fashion in
trademark law is significant.
V. FASHION’S FUNCTION IN DESIGN PATENT LAW
“Function” plays yet a different role in design patent law than in copy-
right and trademark laws.  Much like copyright and trademark laws, design
patent law states that it protects ornamental aspects of qualifying designs and
withholds protection from these designs’ functional features.  That said,
design patent law seems to deem significantly fewer features as “functional”
because of its different doctrinal definitions.  Even if that means that design
patent law might exclude fewer design features from protection than copy-
right and trademark laws, it still must analyze functionality in deciding pro-
tectability.  When it comes to fashion designs covered by design patents, the
law must therefore weigh in the balance design features that look good on as
potentially functional and unprotectable.  After describing how design patent
law treats functional features, we discuss how design patent law might weigh
dual-nature features in fashion that look good on.
A. The Role of Functionality in Design Patent Law
Creators of “any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture” may obtain a design patent.259  Design patents provide protec-
tion from infringement for fifteen years from the date of patent grant.260  To
get a design patent, a design’s creator must apply to the Patent and Trade-
mark Office, where the application will be examined for patentability.261
Unlike copyrights and trademarks, then, there must be some examination
that a creation satisfies the design patentability criteria as a prerequisite to
design patent protection.262
Design patent law does not treat the “ornamental[ity]” requirement as
an affirmative condition that designs be aesthetically pleasing.263  Rather, the
257 For example, although vertical stripes down the leg of a pair of trousers are func-
tional, this does not necessarily mean that trademark law must exclude a particular three-
stripe pattern from protection if there are sufficient options available to other creators.
258 Cf. Hughes, supra note 35 (proposing a test for cognitive functionality in trademark
law).
259 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).  For a historical account of U.S. design patent law, see gen-
erally Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American Design Patent Protection, 88
IND. L.J. 837 (2013).
260 35 U.S.C. §§ 173, 289.
261 Id. §§ 111, 112, 171; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504 (9th ed., rev. Nov. 2015); MATTHEW A.
SMITH, DESIGN PATENTS 7 (preliminary draft) (Dec. 17, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/
media/docs/2012/12/2012-12-17_design_patents.pdf.
262 See Du Mont & Janis, supra note 259, at 842.
263 Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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law has long seen this threshold requirement to mean that designs simply be
“non-functional.”264  The courts have furthermore not understood this
requirement to mean that entire designs are necessarily rendered unprotect-
able for functionality; after all, the “article[s] of manufacture” that design
patent law anticipates will be protected will typically have conventionally
functional uses.265  Instead, courts understand the ornamentality/nonfunc-
tionality requirement to signify that a “design patent only protects the novel,
ornamental features of the patented design.”266
What “functional” means in the context of design patent law seems less
stringent than in copyright and trademark law.  A design feature is func-
tional, and therefore unprotectable, only if the feature is “ ‘dictated by’ the
use or purpose of the article.”267  By contrast, as the Federal Circuit has
explained, “[w]hen there are several ways to achieve the function of an arti-
cle of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily
ornamental purpose.”268  A different design qualifies as an alternative way to
achieve an article’s function only if it provides “the same or similar functional
capabilities” at a level of abstraction that is relatively concrete.269
264 SMITH, supra note 261, at 8; Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design
Protection Systems, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 261, 264 (2012) (noting, but criticizing, this defini-
tion of “ornamental”).  “Ornamental” also subsumes a requirement that the design must
be capable of “be[ing] perceived in [its] normal and intended uses.” In re Webb, 916 F.2d
1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  That is, it cannot always be concealed, or it must be capable
of observation. Id.
265 Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6 (manuscript at 2).
266 OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997); accord
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
267 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (first
quoting In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (C.C.P.A. 1964); then citing Power Controls
Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
268 Id.; accord Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1329–30
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasizing the “availability of alternative designs as an important—if
not dispositive—factor in evaluating the legal functionality of a claimed design”).  Whether
this test of availability of design alternatives is decisive or one factor in a multifactored test
assessing functionality is not clear. See Burstein, supra note 213, at 1456 n.13.
269 Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 796 F.3d at 1331 (quoting Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304
F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In a recent Essay,
Peter Menell and Daniel Yablon take issue with the account of design patent law’s func-
tionality doctrine that we, along with a number of other scholars, have articulated.  Peter S.
Menell & Daniel Yablon, Essay, Star Athletica’s Fissure in the Intellectual Property Functionality
Landscape, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137 (2017).  They suggest that design patent law
never covers the functional aspects of objects and that protection for functionality is
reserved entirely for utility patent law.  Perhaps due to the constraints of the Essay format,
Menell and Yablon offer little in the way of legal support for this claim.  To the contrary,
design patent law cases consistently demonstrate that both the PTO and the courts are
willing to include at least partially utilitarian features of designs within claim scope pre-
cisely because it understands features not to be dictated by the use or purpose of the article
to be nonfunctional. See, e.g., Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316,
1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 994, 996, 998–99
(Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016); see also Sarah Burstein, supra
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Courts assessing design patent infringement compare the design patent
claim—a drawing depicting the patented design270—overall to the defen-
dant’s accused design.271  Infringement is found when “an ordinary observer,
giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, [would find] two designs
are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other.”272
When construing a design patent’s claim scope, care must be taken to “iden-
tify [only] the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the pat-
ent.”273  As such, when the design has a mix of ornamental and functional
features, courts are willing to construe the ornamental aspects verbally and
precisely compared to what is otherwise a holistically visual claim construc-
tion.274  Moreover, the similarity requisite to finding infringement must be
based on a protected design’s ornamental features, and excluding its func-
tional ones.275
Why exclude functional features or designs from design patent protec-
tion?  The ornamentality requirement was inserted into the design patent
note 213; Michael Risch, Functionality and Graphical User Interface Design Patents, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 53, 92–96 (2013).
Part of the confusion in this area may arise from slippage between design patent law’s
declared ban on functionality and the way that ban is actually applied.  If a feature of a
design is treated as “functional” by design patent law, it is to be excluded from the scope of
the designer’s claim.  But a feature is treated as “functional” only in a relatively narrow
class of cases: when it is dictated by function.  This means that many design features that
were not dictated by function but which were instead influenced by function or valued in
part for their functionality would not be treated as functional and, thus, barred by design
patent law.  Of course, design patent law could define “functionality” more strictly to
exclude more features influenced by function.  But as the caselaw makes plain, it does not.
More broadly, as we note above, which features qualify as “functional” in a particular intel-
lectual property regime might differ from those that qualify in another such regime merely
because each regime understands functionality in somewhat distinct ways. See supra text
accompanying note 213.  And each legal notion of “functionality” might not map precisely
to our intuitive notions of what is functional.
270 See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design 3 (unpublished manu-
script in progress).
271 SMITH, supra note 261, at 29.
272 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871).
273 OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing
Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
274 See, e.g., Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
OddzOn Prods., 122 F.3d at 1400, 1405 (approving the district court’s verbal claim construc-
tion—“a ball shaped like a football, with a slender, straight tailshaft projecting from the
rear of the football.  In addition, the . . . Patent design has three fins symmetrically
arranged around the tailshaft, each of which has a gentle curve up and outward which
creates a fin with a larger surface area at the end furthest from the ball.  The fins flare
outwardly along the entire length of the tailshaft, with the front end of the fin extending
slightly up along the side of the football so that the fins seemingly protrude from the inside
of the football”—for a foam football-shaped ball with a tail and fin structure).
275 Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1295–96; OddzOn Prods., 122 F.3d at 1405.
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statute in 1902 at the request of the Patent Commissioner at the time.276
The commissioner indicated that the ornamentality requirement would sepa-
rate design patents from utility patents on the one hand and copyrights on
the other.  With this requirement, design patent law would take:
its proper philosophical position in the field of intellectual production, hav-
ing upon the one side of it the statute providing protection to mechanical
constructions possessing utility of mechanical function, and upon the other
side the copyright law, whereby objects of art are protected, reserving to
itself the position of protecting objects of new and artistic quality pertaining,
however, to commerce, but not justifying their existence upon functional
utility.277
The original judgment then seems to have been that design patents
should cover the “ornamental” aspects of articles of manufacture, while util-
ity patents should govern the “useful” aspects of those same articles.  Each
system would then be carefully calibrated for the encouragement and promo-
tion of those aspects.  And just as discussed above with regard to copyright
and trademark laws, it would be detrimental to competition to allow back-
door utility patents through the design patent system.  However, it is impor-
tant to note that both design and utility patent laws—in contrast to either
copyright or trademark law juxtaposed against utility patent law—have simi-
lar duration and examination rules.278  Perhaps the biggest difference, at
least until recent changes, has been the much more limited scope of design
patents as compared with the broader scope of utility patents.279  Yet since
design patents have become easier to get in relation to utility patents and also
broader in scope because of a distinct infringement standard, worries about
design patents as backdoor utility patents linger.280
One uncertainty in design patent doctrine is how broadly or narrowly to
construe “functionality.”281  For example, in one case involving a design pat-
ent for a football with an arrow-like tail, the design patent holder insisted
that the tail is an ornamental feature because “it is not required for a tossing
276 Du Mont & Janis, supra note 264, at 264–65 (citing sources).
277 S. REP. NO. 57-1139, at 3 (1902).
278 But cf. SMITH, supra note 261, at 13 (justifying the more relaxed “functionality” bar
in design patent law as connected to design patent’s shorter duration).
279 Compare Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, Ltd., 157 F.3d 1311, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rich, J.) (“[D]esign patents have almost no scope beyond the draw-
ings.”), abrogated by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc), with Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design,
17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (discussing how the relative ease of obtaining design
patents and their growing scope has made them more popular recently).  Design patent
scope has also become broader since the Federal Circuit eliminated the point-of-novelty
test in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). See
generally Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011).
280 See supra note 279.
281 See SMITH, supra note 261, at 41 (observing that articulating when designs have the
“same function” for purposes of infringement is “a slippery concept”).
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ball,”282 imputing that relatively broad function to the design.  The Federal
Circuit thought the function was narrower—because “the ball in question is
specifically designed to be thrown like a football, yet travel farther than a
traditional foam football”—yet not so narrow that “these functional charac-
teristics . . . invalidate the design patent, [rather than] merely limit the scope
of the protected subject matter.”283
To take another example closer to this Article’s subject matter of fash-
ion, consider a litigated sneaker design.  The defendant in the case argued
that all features of the design were functional and therefore unprotectable:
[T]he delta wing provides support for the foot and reinforces the shoelace
eyelets; the mesh on the side of the shoe also provides support; the mous-
tache at the back of the shoe provides cushioning for the Achilles tendon
and reinforcement for the rear of the shoe; and the position of each of these
elements on the shoe is due to its function.284
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s characterization as legally
inapt, indicating that the entire claimed design collectively must be dictated
by function, not that claimed features individually are functional.285
In sum, functional and nonfunctional features of designs must be sorted
under design patent law.  Nonfunctional features may be protected, whereas
functional features may not.  That said, courts have made it harder in design
patent law for design features to count as functional, thereby disqualifying
them from design patent protection.  We now turn to how our understand-
ing of fashion’s function can implicate these determinations in design patent
law.
B. Patented Designs That Look Good On
In this Section, we discuss how the “looking good on” function of fash-
ion design can play a role in which aspects of fashion designs are protectable
under design patent law.  There have been long-recognized concerns with
turning to design patent protection for fashion designs generally.  To take
one practical worry, unlike copyright and trademark, which can vest automat-
ically, it takes longer to obtain a design patent.  On average, design patents
issue about twenty months from filing.286  By the time a design patent issues,
282 OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
283 Id.
284 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
285 Id.; accord Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).  This holistic approach to functionality seems to conflict with the element-by-
element approach of assessing ornamentality as nonfunctionality; see supra text accompany-
ing notes 263–266; see also Du Mont & Janis, supra note 264, at 271–81 (highlighting this
doctrinal discrepancy).
286 Robert C. MacKichan III, Despite Increased Hiring, Design Patent Application Backlog
Builds, PROSECUTION FIRST BLOG (Mar. 7, 2016), https://prosecutionfirstblog.com/2016/
03/07/despite-increased-hiring-design-patent-application-backlog-builds.
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the fashion cycle has typically long since moved on, potentially rendering the
protection meaningless for fashion designs.287
Nonetheless, seeking and asserting design patent protection for fashion
designs has become increasingly popular.288  Fashion design companies can
succeed with design patents through speed in filing, combined with luck or
foresight as to which of their designs will transcend the typical fashion
cycle.289  Pertinently, there might be some fashion designs whose popularity
will outlast the time until design patent grant.  As one—perhaps extreme—
example, consider the pricey Herme`s Birkin handbag whose value has,
according to one study, “outpaced both the S&P 500 and the price of gold in
the last 35 years.”290  Filing a design patent on this handbag design would
surely have been a smart investment by Herme`s.  Additionally, as trademark
287 See Beebe, supra note 38, at 864; Christina Phillips, Note, The Real Cinderella Story:
Protecting the Inherent Artistry of the Glass Slipper Using Industrial Design, 48 VAL. U. L. REV.
1177, 1216–17 (2014); Rocky Schmidt, Comment, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for
Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. REV. 861, 868 (1983).  Another concern is whether fashion
designs can be nonobvious, even when they are commercially successful. See, e.g., Belding
Heminway Co. v. Future Fashions, Inc., 143 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944) (per curiam)
(“Such fugitive popularity as fashions in dress are apt to enjoy, are often the result of
caprice; it is impossible for even the most adept students of the market to tell in advance
which ones will succeed, or whether any one will.  Surely in such a setting success is a poor
test of aesthetic achievement.  In the absence of evidence that the design, which happened
to hit the public fancy, was a wide departure from the past, we should not feel justified in
holding the patent valid merely because of its grant.”); White v. Leanore Frocks, Inc., 120
F.2d 113, 114–15 (2d Cir. 1941) (per curiam) (expressing skepticism that “valid design
patents can be procured in [large enough] number as to answer their demand”);
McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 279, at 4 (asking whether a nonobviousness require-
ment is meaningful at all for designs). For a broad look at concerns with design patents,
see Sarah Burstein, Moving Beyond the Standard Criticisms of Design Patents, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV.  305 (2013).
288 See, e.g., Sarah Burstein, Design Patent Myths—You Can Only Get Design Patents for
Applied Ornaments, FACULTY LOUNGE (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:12 AM), http://www.thefaculty
lounge.org/2013/10/ornaments.html; Currently Trending in Fashion: Design Patents, FASH-
ION LAW (June 23, 2016), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/currently-trending-in-
fashion-design-patents; Clare O’Connor, Fashion’s ‘Apple v. Samsung’: Spanx Patent War
Could Change How Brands Fight Copycats, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/clareoconnor/2013/04/10/fashions-apple-vs-samsung-spanx-patent-war-could-
change-how-brands-fight-copycats.
289 Cf. Elizabeth Ferrill & Tina Tanhehco, Protecting the Material World: The Role of Design
Patents in the Fashion Industry, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 251, 292 (2011) (“Choosing to apply for
only a single design patent on one product of many is unlikely to provide long-term benefit
to a designer, primarily because that designer is probably not lucky enough to choose the
‘it’ product of the season.  The wiser strategy is for a designer to commit to patenting
several designs.  As the designer becomes more experienced at filing design patent applica-
tions, she will improve her skills at identifying those parts of a particular design in need of
protection.”).
290 Tara John, Why the Herme`s Birkin Bag Is a Better Investment than Gold, TIME (Jan. 15,
2016), http://time.com/4182246/hermes-birkin-bag-investment-gold (noting that “the
annual return on a Birkin was 14.2%, compared to the S&P average of 8.7% a year and
gold’s -1.5%”).
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law’s strict understanding of the functionality bar has made it harder and
harder to protect certain design features, there has been a greater shift
toward the design patent regime, with its comparatively laxer functionality
restrictions.291  A sampling of recent design patents issued for fashion
designs includes a dinosaur-covered infant body suit,292 a high-fashion (and
trendy) lace-up shoe,293 and a strapless dress design.294
With a newly enhanced focus on design patents for fashion designs will
come a need to separate ornamental design features from functional ones in
fashion designs.295  Consider design patent infringement litigation filed by
athletic and yoga apparel company Lululemon Athletica against apparel
company Calvin Klein in 2012.296  Lululemon accused Calvin Klein of
infringing its design patents on its popular “Astro Pant.”  Figure 9 depicts two
figures of the design patent claim drawing for the Lululemon yoga pant.  Fig-
ure 10 depicts on the left Lululemon’s Astro Pant, a commercialization of its
design patent, and on the right Calvin Klein’s allegedly infringing and
cheaper pant.  Figure 11 shows a back view of the Lululemon Astro Pant.
Figure 9: Litigated Lululemon Pants 297
291 See SMITH, supra note 261, at 13; McKenna, supra note 217.
292 U.S. Patent No. D760,998 (filed July 10, 2013).
293 U.S. Patent No. D750,359 (filed June 25, 2015) (claiming what has been sold as the
Aquazzura Christy shoe).
294 U.S. Patent No. D698,120 (filed Feb. 13, 2012).
295 See supra Part I.
296 Ashby Jones, Downward Docket: The Yoga Pants War, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443696604577645891750143350.
297 U.S. Patent No. D645,644 (filed Apr. 16, 2010).
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Figure 10: Comparison of Lululemon and Calvin Klein Yoga Pants 298
Figure 11: Back view of Lululemon Astro Pant 299
Though the case settled quickly before any substantive rulings on
Lululemon’s design patents or the infringement claim,300 it serves as a help-
ful illustration of how fashion’s function can have an impact on distinguish-
ing ornamental from functional features in design patent law.  Lululemon
298 Jones, supra note 296.
299 Lululemon Astro Pant (Tall) * Full-On Luon, LULU FANATICS, https://www.lulufanatics
.com/item/16338/lululemon-astro-pant-tall-full-on-luon-black-wee-stripe-white-heathered-
medium-grey-white (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
300 Ben Fox Rubin, Lululemon, Calvin Klein Agree to Settle Yoga-Pants Suit, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873248517045781315014
25509018.
Below the Waist 
Lululemon received three patents for Its yoga pants and has 
sued Calvin Klein saying its pants Infringe on the designs. 
LUWLEMON ASTRO PANT CALVIN KLEIN PANT 
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yoga pants, including the claimed design, have become renowned for their
design features that flatter a wearer’s body.  One account, for example, com-
pares Lululemon’s yoga pants to other brands’ cheaper pants, pronouncing
Lululemon’s worth the higher price because Lululemon’s waistband has “this
incredible high rise panel that comes right up to your natural waist . . . and
holds everything in.  I swear, it takes [five] pounds off.”301  Another review
states that the significantly higher cost of Lululemon pants is fully justified by
“a seam across the top of the butt that makes my ass look better than it does
in any other running pants, ever.”302  Taking these accounts at face value,
then, the waistband and back seam are both seemingly ornamental features
that also are functional, in that they change the appearance of the wearer.
Design patent law ought to take account of these dual-nature design fea-
tures in fashion.  That is, the law must sort out how to characterize these
features: as ornamental or not ornamental.  Design patent law must decide
whether these features that function to change the appearance of the wearer
rather than merely to look attractive in their own right are well accounted for
in the calibrations of design patent law or are better addressed by utility pat-
ent law.303
Design patent law must also develop a better account of the level of
abstraction at which to assess function.304  Is the function of the yoga pant in
part to slim and to enhance the body’s curves?  If so, with regard to slimming,
is the relevant function to slim generally, which can be accomplished in a
myriad of ways, or to slim with a well-designed waistband?  Similarly, with
regard to enhancing the curves, is the relevant function to enhance curves
generally or to enhance the backside curve through use of a well-placed
seam?  Depending on the level of abstraction, the pant’s slimming and curve-
enhancing features might or might not be dictated by function.
As with our discussion of trademark law, we do not here offer a complete
analysis about the best rules for design patent law’s functionality screen.
Determining the optimal scope for any of these fields involves a sophisticated
inquiry into a variety of different costs and benefits, including the need for
incentives to create and commercialize new designs, the existence of adminis-
tration and adjudication costs, and the effects of protection on competi-
tion.305  Nonetheless, our contribution here is significant: To the extent that
design patent law—or the other non-utility patent IP regimes—ignores fash-
301 Jo-Lynne Shane, Fashion/Fitness Friday :: Lululemon Review, JO-LYNNE SHANE (Jan. 11,
2013), http://www.jolynneshane.com/lululemon-review.html (noting also how the pants
are technologically functional by keeping her “completely comfortable in [thirty] degree
weather, even with the wind blowing”).
302 Sarah Mesle, The Unbearable Awesomeness of Lululemon Pants, AVIDLY (June 4, 2013),
http://avidly.lareviewofbooks.org/2013/06/04/the-unbearable-awesomeness-of-lululem
on-pants (indicating how others praise these pants for their durability over time).
303 See supra text accompanying notes 276–280.
304 See supra text accompanying notes 281–285.
305 See Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 6 (manuscript at 1).
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ion’s function it risks imposing substantial limits on competition, stifling
innovation, and increasing costs to consumers.
CONCLUSION
The account of fashion’s function that we develop in this Article clarifies
how intellectual property law should treat fashion design.  It recognizes an
important way in which designs are functional—when they affect how wear-
ers’ bodies are perceived.  This is not simply an issue with fashion design,
however.  As fashion designer and businesswoman Coco Chanel famously
said, “Fashion is not something that exists in dresses only.  Fashion is in the
sky, in the street.  Fashion has to do with the ideas, the way we live, what is
happening.”306  Looking beyond fashion, many visual media can affect the
ways that we perceive objects. Trompe l’oeil painting and camouflage tech-
niques have this effect.  The same is true of chemical or physical processes for
developing pigments, such as Vantablack, a carbon nanotube surface coating
that produces the sensation of perfect blackness.307  Attempts to gain intel-
lectual property protection for any of these techniques, unless through the
patent system, should be met with intense skepticism.
306 See Rachel Dixon, Coco Before Chanel: ‘She Was Claiming Freedom Through Her Designs,’
GUARDIAN (July 31, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/jul/31/coco-
before-chanel.
307 See Elizabeth Blair, Some Artists Are Seeing Red over a New ‘Black,’ NPR (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/03/469082803/some-artists-are-see
ing-red-over-a-new-black.
